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IS GUILT DISPOSITIVE? FEDERAL HABEAS AFTER
MARTINEZ
JUSTIN F. MARCEAU*
ABSTRACT
Federal habeas review of criminal convictions is not supposed to
be a second opportunity to adjudge guilt. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
among others, has said that the sole question on federal habeas is
whether the prisoner’s constitutional rights were violated. By the
early 1970s, however, scholars criticized this rights-based view of
habeas and sounded the alarm that postconviction review had
become too far removed from questions of innocence. Most famously,
in 1970 Judge Friendly criticized the breadth of habeas corpus by
posing a single question: Is innocence irrelevant? In his view habeas
review that focused exclusively on questions of rights in isolation
from questions of innocence was misguided. 
Over the last forty years the habeas landscape has changed so
dramatically—through both statutory and common law limits on the
writ—that it is appropriate to ask a very different question: Is guilt
dispositive? Both substantive law and habeas procedure have evolved
so as to substantially disadvantage a guilty habeas petitioner. In
many cases, regardless of the merits of the constitutional claim,
strong evidence of guilt is dispositive in ensuring that relief is denied.
A recent trilogy of cases—Holland v. Florida, Maples v. Thomas, and
most importantly, Martinez v. Ryan—signals a potential shift in the
Court’s innocence orientation. This Article explores the potential
impact of these decisions and, in particular, argues that they may
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2071
2072 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
provide a roadmap for a proceduralist approach to modern habeas
review that prioritizes fair procedures over innocence. The impact of
Friendly’s call for greater focus on innocence was gradual but
profound, and this Article argues that the Martinez trilogy may be
similarly important in reversing habeas’s four-decade-long infatua-
tion with innocence.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom is that federal habeas is a meager
shadow of its former self.1 The once “Great Writ,”2 it seems, has
become emaciated by unforgiving procedural rules and one of the
most deferential substantive standards of review known to law.3
Federal review is inhospitable to relief and ever more focused on the
actual innocence of the defendant. The answer to the most famous
question about federal habeas corpus—“Is innocence irrele-
vant?”4—then, increasingly seems to be no. Indeed, one might fairly
assert that, in light of modern statutory and case law developments,
guilt and innocence have become the central considerations—that
is, guilt is dispositive such that procedural vindication in the
absence of a claim of innocence is rare to the point of near impossi-
bility. The Supreme Court’s recent abandonment of the habeas
statute of limitations in the face of a colorable claim of innocence is
illustrative.5 
Perhaps, however, a shift is afoot. In just the last couple of terms,
the Court’s jurisprudence has reflected a newfound interest in
permitting federal habeas to play the role of ensuring a full and fair
1. Empirical data confirms this claim. A recent study showed that noncapital prisoners
were granted federal habeas relief in less than 0.5 percent of all cases. See NANCY J. KING ET
AL., HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 58-59 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. Renowned death penalty advocate Stephen Bright has
argued that modern limits on habeas review have made relief so unlikely that “it is
appropriate to ask ... whether fairness is irrelevant” to collateral review. Stephen B. Bright,
Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the
Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 5 (1997)
(citing Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970)). 
2. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *129 (referencing the writ of habeas corpus as “the most celebrated writ in
the English law”).
3. See Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9,
35-36 (1990). 
4. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 159-60 (1970) (emphasis added).
5. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (refusing to insist on the
elements of due diligence or exceptional circumstances required for equitable tolling when
there is a colorable claim of actual innocence). 
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state court process.6 Although it is far too early to make concrete
predictions, some of the habeas scholars who have advocated a
process-based orientation for federal review have seen signs of such
theories being vindicated in habeas doctrine. Recent cases provide
support for the view that federal habeas must, at the very least,
play an active role in policing the procedures of state appellate and
postconviction review. There is, in short, a resurgence of optimism
in a legal-process view of habeas corpus. This Article maps the ebbs
and flows of guilt-centered adjudications in federal habeas for the
last century and is the first to examine in detail the scope of this
new, process-oriented habeas optimism by considering the promises
and limits of recent doctrinal shifts. A new era of federal habeas
review—one that is concerned with process and not just guilt—is not
inconceivable.
Part I revisits the details of Judge Friendly’s half-century-old
critique of expansive federal habeas. In particular, I explore the
context for his assertion that a colorable claim of innocence should
generally be required for a federal court to ignore the limits of
finality and set aside a state conviction.7 
6. Of course, the trajectory of Supreme Court decisions cannot be described as truly
linear. Recent decisions like McQuiggin, for example, tend to reflect a continued
preoccupation with innocence. On the whole, however, the trend seems to reflect an increasing
focus on process oriented habeas. See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 
7. At this point in history, Friendly’s work stands for the proposition that innocence
should be central, and I am using his work for that proposition. Of course, Friendly echoed
the earlier sentiments of Paul Bator by acknowledging that in certain circumstances habeas
relief should be available even in the absence of a strong showing of innocence. See Friendly,
supra note 4, at 152-53 (singling out unfair state procedures “at trial and on appeal” but not
referencing state postconviction review). But it must be remembered that Friendly starts his
essay by calling it “incredib[le]” that the Court had not accepted Justice Black’s view that in
habeas a defendant should never be entitled to relief unless he raises a claim that “casts some
shadow of a doubt on his guilt.” Id. at 142-43. The courts, Congress, and commentators,
including Friendly’s biographer, have described him as advocating for a conservative view of
habeas that is without rival in American history. Commenting on Friendly’s influence, a
recent biography noted that scholars have detected a shift in “the pith of the habeas inquiry”
such that innocence has moved to center stage. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY 219
(2012). My point is not to opine on whether or not Judge Friendly would have appreciated the
full-throated innocence approach identified in this in Article, but the defining aspect of
Friendly’s habeas legacy is certainly its connection to innocence. See Roger Berkowitz, Error-
Centricity, Habeas Corpus, and the Rule of Law as the Law of Rulings, 64 LA. L. REV. 477, 491
(2004) (describing the Friendly-endorsed view of habeas as a shift from considering the
“presence of error understood as unfairness, to error understood as an inaccurate
determination of guilt”). 
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Part II advances an initial thesis, namely, that in the years since
Friendly’s article, federal habeas has undergone an about-face such
that in the absence of a showing of innocence, relief is almost always
denied on federal habeas review. Questions of guilt are no longer
irrelevant; they are oftentimes controlling.8 Indeed, doctrines are
altered and distorted in order to reflect the judicial preoccupation
with innocence. This claim is developed and defended by surveying
a wide range of habeas procedural rules, as well as the mechanics
for litigating certain substantive claims. 
Parts III and IV pose the question of how much optimism is
warranted in the wake of cases like Martinez and Maples. Are these
cases fool’s gold, unlikely to impact the day-to-day litigation of post-
conviction claims? Or, as we approach the golden anniversary of
Friendly’s article, might there be room for renewed optimism about
federal habeas litigation that is untethered from strong showings of
innocence? The answer to this question turns on a concrete assess-
ment of the limitations imposed by these cases, either by their plain
text or by reference to the greater habeas common law, and an
assessment of how these cases have been applied in the lower
federal courts. In the end, the numerous procedural questions
surrounding the eventual application of recent decisions make it
impossible to predict precisely how far-reaching the shift in the
habeas landscape will be; however, unlike other scholarly works,
this Article predicts that the emphasis on fair state court procedures
represents the most monumental, prodefendant shift in habeas law
in at least forty years. 
This Article provides an explicitly descriptive and predictive
account of modern habeas review. The first half of the paper
summarizes the innocence focus of modern habeas prior to Martinez
v. Ryan, and the latter half explores the likely and probable shifts
in federal habeas in a post-Martinez world. More specifically, for
decades, the guilt of the defendant has been a dispositive barrier to
habeas relief.9 But a change appears to be afoot. Scholars and the
8. In a sense, innocence has emerged as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for re-
lief. See DORSEN, supra note 7, at 214-15 (calling Friendly’s approach more “conservative” than
others because he desired that prisoners show both innocence and a constitutional injury).
9. Summarizing Judge Friendly’s influence, one pair of commentators has observed the
“ascendancy of innocence.” Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry
Friendly Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 606 (1991). 
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Supreme Court itself seem to recognize a role for federal habeas in
policing the adequacy of state appellate and postconviction proce-
dures. At least in certain circumstances, federal habeas review must
be permitted even if the defendant is patently guilty. This shift is
consistent with a normative vision of habeas that scholars, includ-
ing myself, have advocated for over the past decade.
I. THE ORIGINAL MODEL: INNOCENCE AS IRRELEVANT
This Article focuses primarily on the contrast between the post-
Warren Court innocence era and the rise of a potential post-
Martinez process era. To provide some necessary context, however,
a brief overview of the pre-Warren Court habeas history is neces-
sary. 
A. A Brief History of Modern Habeas, 1789-1970
Any attempt to distill doctrine is prone to oversimplification, if
not outright misinterpretation.10 This rule applies with more force
than usual in the realm of habeas corpus because even the most
respected scholars have disagreed and continue to disagree about
the history of federal oversight of state convictions. There is
disagreement about the basic purpose and origins of the writ all the
way through to the meaning of the modern habeas reforms of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and
everything in-between.
The controversy begins with the constitutional standing of habeas
corpus. The Constitution, by its plain terms in the “Suspension
Clause,” does not provide an affirmative right to habeas corpus, but
rather creates a general prohibition on the writ’s suspension.11 This
10. Moreover, comprehensive histories of habeas corpus have been provided by leading
scholars in the field. See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT
WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 463-99 (1963); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two
Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 279-80 (1988); Anne Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
For a thoughtful discussion on how the Suspension Clause should be read in the context of
persons not facing criminal charges, see Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the
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has given rise to an ongoing debate over whether the Constitution
provides an affirmative right to habeas review, and if so, whether
that right applies to prevent Congress from depriving federal
prisoners, state prisoners, or both of the right to federal court
oversight of their convictions.12 And this disagreement about what
the Suspension Clause means spills over into debates about what
the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Act) means. The conventional reading
of the Act is that it “provided federal courts the authority to grant
habeas corpus to federal prisoners.”13 But one of the most distin-
guished habeas scholars and historians, Eric Freedman, concluded
based on archival research that “ever since the government began
to function, the federal courts have had the power, both by federal
statute and independently of it, to issue writs of habeas corpus in
order to free state prisoners held in violation of federal law.”14 This
is no mere idle conclusion insofar as it speaks to the original
meaning of the Constitution and habeas corpus.15
Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 903 (2012) (“The Suspension Clause remains a
puzzle. Just what the Founding generation had in mind when they included it in the
Constitution remains the subject of great debate, as does the role that it should play today in
regulating government action taken in the name of national security.”). 
12. Compare WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126-56
(1980) (concluding that the Suspension Clause only applies to prevent Congress from
impeding a state court’s ability to grant the writ), with Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75 (1807) (concluding that the clause provides federal prisoners with an affirmative right to
federal habeas review), id. at 95 (noting that if the Constitution did not require congressional
enactment of a right to habeas corpus, then “the privilege itself would be lost, although no law
for its suspension should be enacted”), and Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92
MICH. L. REV. 862, 871-74 (1994) (concluding there is a constitutional right to federal
oversight of state convictions). For a more detailed explanation of this history, see Eric M.
Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451 (1996). 
13. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.2, at 897 (5th ed. 2007).
14. Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I–Just Because John Marshall
Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ
of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 539
(2000); see also id. at 541 (“[T]he fact that habeas corpus powers were conferred on the federal
courts by statute does not support Ex parte Bollman’s thesis that they would have lacked
those powers in the absence of such a grant. Had the statute never been passed, the federal
courts would still have had the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus and, specifically, to
issue it to state prisoners.”).
15. Although it is commonplace for the Supreme Court to apply the writ “as it exists
today, rather than as it existed in 1789,” Freedman, among others, has noted that the Court
does so begrudgingly because it regards the modern application of the writ to be
fundamentally different than the historical application. See id. at 537.
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Despite confusion and disagreement regarding the statutory and
constitutional origins of habeas corpus in the United States, one
might reasonably assume that with the Reconstruction Era
enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 (Act of 1867),16 federal
courts and scholars would, at least as of this date, achieve consensus
regarding the scope and nature of appropriate federal oversight.
Such an assumption has proven misplaced.17 Indeed, some of the
most famous debates about the nature of federal habeas jurisdiction
arose out of the Act of 1867. For example, Paul Bator famously
argued for a very limited form of federal habeas review by reasoning
that the Act of 1867 only permitted habeas relief when a state
conviction was entered without jurisdiction.18 Judge Friendly
applauded Bator’s insights, calling them “brilliant and suggestive.”19
By contrast, Gary Peller argued that the legislative history as well
as the lessons of the Reconstruction Era dictated that nearly
unlimited federal review of state convictions was essential to a
properly functioning constitutional democracy and anticipated by
the Act of 1867.20 
16. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (repealed 1868 and replaced by Act of March
27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 and subsequently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
55 (2006)).
17. Lee Kovarsky’s recent scholarship, however, promises to bring greater consensus to
this field. Kovarsky has made a persuasive historical case that the Constitution grants federal
habeas authority over federal courts, see Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas
Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 781-94 (2013), and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state prisoners a federal habeas forum, see Lee
Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges Under the Fourteenth Amendment (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges].
Kovarsky’s work has the potential to bring greater consensus to the question of whether state
prisoners are constitutionally entitled to federal habeas review. 
18. Bator, supra note 10, at 526-27. One scholar has concisely and accurately summarized
the thrust of Bator’s project by saying: 
Paul Bator’s Process Model, for example, would give federal habeas courts the
power to consider state criminal cases only if (1) the state prisoner was not
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claims in state
court, or (2) the state court did not have jurisdiction over his case.
Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010).
19. DORSEN, supra note 7, at 211 (quoting Letter from Henry J. Friendly, Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Paul M. Bator, Professor, Harvard Law School
(Jan. 28, 1963)). 
20. Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 662-63 (1982). 
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This fundamental disagreement between Peller and Bator
undergirds much of the modern habeas debate. Those who view the
Warren Court as having fundamentally expanded the reach of the
writ like Bator and soon thereafter, Judge Friendly—see themselves
as simply advocating for a return to the legislatively and constitu-
tionally intended scope of federal habeas review. By contrast, those
who do not perceive any fundamental shift in the scope of habeas
review during the Warren era find the call to narrow the writ’s
reach perplexing. Illustrative of this tension, one set of commenta-
tors frequently describes the Warren Court as having supplanted
legislative discretion on the issue by drastically expanding the reach
of federal habeas review, often citing Brown v. Allen for this point.21
For example, Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann have concluded
that the Court dramatically “expand[ed] the availability and scope
of federal habeas review.”22 Others, however, have essentially said
that the Warren Court generally, and the Brown decision in
particular, broke no new ground in federal habeas and attribute this
false history to the prominence of Paul Bator’s academic writing.23
Eric Freedman, for example, has described the Warren Court’s
habeas revolution as the revolution that was not, explaining, in
part, that:
None of the developments, judicial or legislative, that followed
upon the release of the [Brown] decision support the view that
it significantly re-shaped the legal landscape. Nor did any of the
contemporary antagonists over the appropriate scope of habeas
corpus view it as having done so. Prior to the appearance of
Bator’s article, Brown was just another, not particularly
prominent, episode in an ongoing contest that had begun long
before and continues to this day. Indeed, to the extent it had any
immediate impact at all, Brown seems to have increased the rate
at which federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners were
summarily denied.24
21. 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1953); see Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 803 (2009).
22. Hoffmann & King, supra note 21, at 801.
23. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part III–Brown v. Allen:
The Habeas Corpus Revolution That Wasn’t, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541, 1549-50 (2000).
24. Id. at 1610 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1547 (“[E]mbracing seven collections of
documents—and including two sets of notes of the critical Court conference—demonstrates
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Likewise, some have explained that the Warren era did not effect
a material expansion of federal habeas oversight, but rather its
decisions were substantially in accord with the Suspension Clause
and the Act of 1867.25
So, it is fair to say there is no consensus about whether or exactly
how much the Warren Court expanded the scope of federal habeas
review. Nonetheless, appearances often shape judicial reality. The
conventional wisdom, even according to leading treatises, is that it
was not until the Warren era that the “scope of habeas corpus began
to change dramatically” such that the availability of habeas corpus
was “greatly liberalized.”26 Whether this perception is historically
accurate or not,27 there is no question that it spurred calls for reform
that have had a dramatic impact on federal habeas litigation and
scholarship. Judge Friendly’s famous article is an important piece
of this historical legacy. 
B. An (Un)-Friendly Response to the Expanding Reach of the Writ
There is no question as to which side of the habeas debate Judge
Henry Friendly fell. In 1970 Judge Friendly delivered a speech and
that the Justices did not view themselves as making new law concerning the scope of the
writ.”) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in refuting the notion that federal habeas was originally
the province of federal courts for reviewing federal convictions alone, Freedman has noted
that “[i]n approaching Suspension Clause issues, the Court, like scholars, proceeds on the
assumption that the [Suspension] Clause originally protected only federal, not state,
prisoners. This assumption is a mistake.” Freedman, supra note 14, at 536 (footnotes
omitted); see also William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, 36 J. SOUTH. HIST. 530, 544 (1970) (discussing the belief that the Act of 1867 led
to federal review of state court decisions); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2341-48 (1993) (discussing the views of the Court and scholars regarding
habeas corpus for state prisoners).
25. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 20, at 662-63. Additionally, such scholars might argue that
it was the expansion of procedural and substantive rights at the hands of the Court that led
to a greater reliance on federal habeas corpus.
26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 899-900 (citing Brown as one of the “most important
changes” in federal habeas review).
27. Even habeas historians like Eric Freedman seem to acknowledge that certain
decisions from the Warren era represented important changes in the status quo. Freedman,
supra note 23, at 1616. For example, Fay v. Noia permitted federal habeas relief of a claim
not presented properly to the state court in all circumstances other than those in which the
defendant “deliberately by-passed” the state procedures, and is probably fairly understood as
a landmark decision. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
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published an article by the same title criticizing what he perceived
to be the unprincipled expansion of federal habeas review under the
Warren Court.28 In Friendly’s telling of the habeas history, the writ
“initially serving a felt need has expanded bit by bit, without much
thought being given to any single step, until it ... assumed an aspect
so different from its origin as to demand reappraisal.”29 
Specifically, Friendly lamented the fact that federal habeas relief
was often granted without any concern for whether the prisoner was
actually guilty of the offense—that is, Friendly objected to an era of
habeas review in which, in his view, innocence had become
irrelevant.30 Friendly began his presentation of this issue by quoting
a dissent from Justice Black: “In collateral attacks ... I would always
require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional
claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt.”31 To Friendly,
it was utterly “incredibl[e] [that] these statements were made in
dissent” rather than as a statement of law.32 And “[e]ven more
incredibl[e],” according to Friendly, was the fact that other
dissenting Justices had even expressed qualms with the harshness
of Black’s proposal.33 The noncentral role that innocence played
in habeas review was a major failing of the federal system in
Friendly’s view.34
To remedy what he saw as the dramatic expansion of federal
habeas review under the Warren Court, Friendly recommended
that, as a general matter, federal habeas review should be barred
28. Friendly, supra note 4.
29. Id. at 142; see also id. at 143 (claiming that his project was designed to “restore the
Great Writ to its deservedly high estate and rescue it from the disrepute invited by current
excesses”).
30. Id. at 172.
31. Id. at 142 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). 
32. Id. at 143. 
33. Id.
34. Id. (summarizing his article as an effort to “rescue [habeas corpus] from the disrepute
invited by current excesses”). As previously noted, my point is not to gloss over the fact that
Friendly’s habeas model allowed for federal oversight of unfair procedures, which it explicitly
did. Rather, my point is to emphasize that Friendly has become associated with a model of
habeas that is primarily interested in preventing the punishment of innocents. See, e.g.,
Berkowitz, supra note 7, at 498 (crediting Friendly and Bator with having “prodded” the Court
to shift the focus of the habeas inquiry from procedural fairness to “verdict accuracy”);
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 606 (noting that Friendly substantially succeeded
in converting “factual guilt” into one of the “dominant themes of federal habeas corpus”). 
2084 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
unless the prisoner could make a colorable showing of innocence.35
Framing his argument, Judge Friendly explained:
The proverbial man from Mars would surely think we must
consider our system of criminal justice terribly bad if we are
willing to tolerate such efforts at undoing judgments of convic-
tion. He would be surprised, I should suppose, to be told both
that it never was really bad and that it has been steadily
improving, particularly because of the Supreme Court’s decision
that an accused, whatever his financial means, is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at every critical stage. His astonishment
would grow when we told him that the one thing almost never
suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent
of the crime.36
To be sure, Friendly was not only concerned with innocence. He
recognized, for example, that state procedures must be sufficiently
fair as to warrant nonintervention by the federal courts.37 But his
driving concern was what he perceived to be the Warren Court’s
expansion of habeas remedies for the guilty. As Friendly put it, “I
perceive no general principle mandating a second round of attacks
simply because the alleged error is a ‘constitutional’ one.”38 Because
the scope of the Bill of Rights was expanded in the 1960s, Friendly,
quite simply, found nothing particularly unique or deserving of
additional process about an allegation of constitutional error.39 Any
“resourceful defense lawyer,” he quipped, can frame defects in the
trial as “constitutional” error.40 The very label “constitutional error,”
35. Friendly, supra note 4, at 160 (defining colorable claim of innocence as true innocence
and not merely a showing that one would not have been convicted but for the illegally
obtained evidence or statements); see infra note 43 (elaborating Friendly’s innocence
standard); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and
Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 609-10 (2005) (describing Friendly’s article as
having “repudiated the Warren Court’s expansive treatment of collateral federal review of
state court convictions as a vehicle for the consideration of all federal constitutional claims”).
36. Friendly, supra note 4, at 145; cf. id. at 145 n.12 (quoting Chief Justice Burger as
having observed that in some cases the “accused continued his warfare with society for eight,
nine, ten years and more”). 
37. Id. at 152-53.
38. Id. at 155. 
39. Id. at 156.
40. Id. (“Today it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a constitutional claim.”).
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then, was viewed as carrying “a connotation of outrage ... which is
wholly misplaced.”41 
 In short, Friendly argued for a system of federal habeas review
in which, absent a few very limited circumstances such as unfair42
or nonexistent state court review process, federal oversight is only
permitted upon a showing of innocence.43 The common, if reduction-
ist, understanding of Friendly’s thesis, then, is that innocence is an
essential “precondition for federal habeas relief.”44 Such a proposal
was said to be needed to “prevent abuse by prisoners [and] a waste
41. Id. at 156-57.
42. The practicing lawyer knows that in many cases this is where the rubber hits the road.
Problems of incompetent or underfunded counsel, refusal to permit discovery by a prisoner,
or refusal to fund postconviction experts are recurring and debilitating problems. See, e.g.,
Hoffmann & King, supra note 21, at 816, 832-33. At the time Friendly was writing, habeas
was conceived of so broadly that acknowledging a baseline requirement of full and fair state
review was an obvious, even necessary condition for being taken seriously. More recently,
however, the innocence focus of Friendly’s article has garnered prominence, but the baseline
assumption about full and fair state review has often been overlooked. See Justin F. Marceau,
Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudication,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (2010); see also Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in
Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV.
591, 592-94 (2013) (discussing the use of full and fair state review in two current cases). In
Parts III and IV of this Article, I demonstrate how the modern body of procedural scholarship,
which emphasizes the fair procedure aspects of Friendly’s and Bator’s work, is coming of age
in recent Supreme Court decisions. 
43. Friendly, supra note 4, at 160. To make such a showing, mere doubt about guilt is
insufficient; rather the prisoner would have to:
show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged
to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it)
and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become
available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Id. This formulation bears a striking resemblance to the Schlup standard of innocence as a
gateway. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (“[I]f a petitioner such as Schlup presents
evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial
unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error,
the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his
underlying claims.”).
44. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 610 (“While the Court did not directly embrace
potential innocence as a precondition for federal habeas relief, it instead repeatedly tightened
procedural requirements for federal habeas petitions.”). This is not to suggest that the
Steikers engaged in a reductionist reading of Judge Friendly. Quite the contrary, their work
aptly illustrates the way that courts, legislators, and commentators have come to understand
and apply Friendly’s proposal over the last half century. 
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of the precious and limited resources available for the criminal
process.”45 
History has been kind to Friendly’s proposals.46 Judge Friendly’s
call for greater focus on innocence and finality achieved substantial
success.47 First, federal habeas review, particularly after the
enactment of the AEDPA,48 is considerably less hospitable to any
federal judgments that would disturb the federalism concerns and
finality of a state conviction.49 Moreover, it is widely recognized that
in recent years there is a growing concern with the innocence of the
petitioner. For example, Jordan Steiker observed that the Court’s
habeas jurisprudence has increasingly and “repeatedly emphasized
that the availability of habeas relief should depend in large measure
on whether the petitioner is factually innocent.”50 Others have echo-
ed this sentiment, noting that “[i]nnocence is now unquestionably
45. Friendly, supra note 4, at 172. It is worth noting that Friendly did expect state courts
to provide a full and fair process to prisoners. He observed that the “state is bound by the
supremacy clause to honor all constitutional guarantees,” but emphasized that the state “is
not bound to honor them more than once.” Id. In other words, each prisoner must be afforded
at least one full and fair opportunity for review of his constitutional claims. See Marceau,
supra note 42, at 8-9. Such a recognition is entirely consistent with the recent landmark
decision, Martinez v. Ryan, insofar as Martinez recognizes a right to have one’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fully and fairly aired. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012); see discussion infra
Part III. 
46. Of course, not everyone agrees with Friendly’s reading of the habeas history or with
his recommendation that innocence play a central role in determining who is eligible for
habeas review. Leading habeas scholars Randy Hertz and James Liebman, for example, have
argued that the history of our Constitution suggests that a prisoner’s “apparent guilt should
heighten, not cut off or diminish” federal habeas oversight. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.5, at 93, 95 (6th ed. 2011) (explaining
that because the federal courts play a constitutional role in protecting against the tyranny of
“local spirit,” guilt “may pose the classic circumstance in which substitute federal appellate
review under the writ is especially necessary” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 486
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
47. Leading scholars in the criminal law field have called for limiting federal habeas by
focusing more on protections for the innocent. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J.
Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 679, 691-92 (1990).
48. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
49. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory,
and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 606 (1999) (arguing that AEDPA
does not necessarily favor or disadvantage innocence but rather prioritizes federalism
concerns); Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges, supra note 17, at 58; Marceau, supra
note 42, at 34-40.
50. Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 304 (1993).
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relevant to federal habeas corpus review.”51 Another scholar
explained, “As if in answer to Judge Friendly’s original query, ... the
Court shift[ed] the pith of the habeas inquiry from procedural
demands for fairness to substantive claims of innocence.”52 
The following Part elaborates on the growing number of proce-
dural and substantive barriers to habeas relief that are predicated
on a desire to ensure that the guilty do not have access to federal
habeas relief.53 
II. THE INNOCENCE REVOLUTION: GUILT AS DISPOSITIVE
The state of postconviction law in 1970 compelled Judge Friendly
to ask whether innocence had become irrelevant to federal habeas.
Today it is much more salient to consider the extent to which guilt
has become dispositive. This Part examines the development of a
federal habeas jurisprudence that drastically disadvantages guilty
defendants. Specifically, it examines changes in both procedural and
substantive habeas law that prioritize a showing of innocence (or
likely innocence) over a vindication of constitutional rights.54
Despite the fact that several of the Supreme Court’s decisions tend
to reject a direct link between innocence and habeas relief,55 the con-
nection between the accuracy of the trial result and the availability
51. Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to
AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 378 (2001); see
McQuiggen v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (recognizing an innocence exception to the
statute of limitations). 
52. DORSEN, supra note 7, at 219 (alteration in original) (citing Berkowitz, supra note 7,
at 501). 
53. Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 610 (“While the Court did not directly embrace
potential innocence as a precondition for federal habeas relief, it instead repeatedly tightened
procedural requirements for federal habeas petitions.”). 
54. The habeas culture has developed such that innocence is critically important to relief,
and constitutional rights are regarded as “nothing more than a collection of ‘technicalities.’”
Bright, supra note 1, at 27 (explaining that modern habeas law reflects the view that “results
are more important than process, that finality is more important than fairness, and that
proceeding with executions is more important than determining whether convictions and
sentences were obtained fairly and reliably”).
55. Friedman, supra note 10, at 319 (“In the series of cases beginning with Stone v. Powell
and culminating recently in Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court rejected innocence as a
limitation on the scope of the writ.”); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979)
(granting habeas relief based on the failure of a grand jury selection process to be free from
racial discrimination). 
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of federal habeas relief is, at this point in history, beyond peradven-
ture for many aspects of habeas litigation. 
As an initial matter, however, it is necessary to explain that the
shift toward a more guilt-centered model does not reflect a corre-
sponding maturation in the postconviction procedures for vindicat-
ing innocence claims. The focus is on denying relief to the guilty, not
on providing relief to the innocent.56 
A. A Focus on Guilt Rather Than Innocence
Although this Article identifies a dramatic reorientation of federal
habeas—from the arguably freewheeling 1960s to the guilt focus of
the modern era—it is important to distinguish between a guilt-
centered and an innocence-centered model of habeas. Modern
habeas is preoccupied with the former. Guilt has become a defining
feature in denying federal habeas relief to prisoners, but a showing
of innocence is, in many instances, still irrelevant to the likelihood
of relief.57 Stephen Bright, for example, has documented how
modern procedures have resulted in numerous innocent persons
being convicted, and even sentenced to death.58
56. As some scholars have remarked, “The question Judge Friendly really was asking in
1970” is not whether innocence was irrelevant but whether guilt was irrelevant: “[H]is real
concern was with regard to the ‘great multitude of applications not deserving [the court’s]
attention’ because the petitioners are steeped in guilt.” Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note
9, at 622 (alteration in original) (quoting Friendly, supra note 4, at 150). 
57. The most notable counterexample is McQuiggin v. Perkins, which recognized actual
innocence as a basis for excusing an untimely federal habeas petition. 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928
(2013). Prior to McQuiggin, even though equitable tolling of the habeas statute of limitations
was permitted, a majority of federal courts had rejected an innocence exception to the statute
of limitations. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that innocence
is not an exception to the statute of limitations. Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1128-31 (9th
Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011); Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868,
871-72 (7th Cir. 2005); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 346-48 (1st Cir. 2003); Cousin v. Lensing,
310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2002). Only
the Sixth Circuit had reached a definitive contrary conclusion. Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577,
599-600 (6th Cir. 2005); see also In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
58. Bright, supra note 1, at 5-6, 24 (identifying a few notable examples of wrongful
convictions); see also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED, TOO MANY WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250
.pdf; Reports and Publications, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/reports.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (annual reports detailing such topics as wrongful
convictions).
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Moreover, leading habeas scholar Brandon Garrett has responded
forcefully to the idea that innocence has assumed the cherished role
anticipated by Judge Friendly:
In his influential 1970 article, Judge Henry Friendly provoca-
tively asked why innocence is irrelevant to federal habeas corpus
review. Judge Friendly proposed that innocence should provide
a ground for relief from a criminal conviction, but his call went
unheeded, perhaps because at that time innocence could rarely
be proven with any certainty.... Claims asserting the existence
of new evidence of innocence were considered fundamentally
equivocal, and, as a result, states imposed strict rules of finality,
barring claims brought after limitation periods expired. Thus, in
the decades since Judge Friendly first asked whether innocence
should be relevant to criminal appeals, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declined to recognize a constitutional claim of
innocence ... [And even with the advent of DNA evidence], the
Court narrowly failed to recognize a constitutional innocence
claim.59
As Garrett points out, Friendly argued that “there should be an
exception to the concept of finality when a prisoner can make a
colorable claim of actual innocence.”60 However, modern federal
habeas law does not afford a critical role for innocence.61 For
example, commentators have observed that the Court “has not
explicitly ruled that freestanding innocence claims are grounded in
the Constitution.”62 Other commentators and judges have concluded
59. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1630-31 (2008)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 1716 (“Everything and nothing has changed since 1970, when
Judge Friendly called the lack of a freestanding constitutional innocence claim ‘an anomaly.’”
(quoting Friendly, supra note 4, at 158-60 & n.87)); id. at 1630-31 (“[I]n the decades since
Judge Friendly first asked whether innocence should be relevant to criminal appeals, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a constitutional claim of innocence.”).
60. Id. at 1704 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 438 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
61. A striking example of judicial indifference to innocence and fixation on the legal con-
struction of guilt is the practice of permitting defendants to plead guilty and waive access to
DNA testing that could exonerate them. Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 952, 1016-17 (2012) (discussing the growing practice of plea deals including DNA waivers).
62. Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV.
139, 171 (2012). But see id. at 175-76 (observing that in one prominent case the Supreme
Court exercised its original habeas jurisdiction to transfer a case of potential innocence to a
district court for fact-finding). 
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that even if there is an actual innocence claim in the death penalty
context, in noncapital cases there is no reason to assume that a
claim of freestanding innocence has any constitutional grounding.63
For its part, the Supreme Court has blithely stated that “[f]ew
rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to
provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual
innocence.”64 
Thus, the law has developed such that guilt plays a critical role
in barring access to relief, as discussed immediately below, and yet
litigating claims of innocence remains disfavored and nearly
impossible.65 That is to say, innocence is still irrelevant as a vehicle
for obtaining relief, but guilt is often determinative in a denial of
relief. 
B. Modern Habeas and the Role of Guilt
In a sense, one could imagine Judge Friendly would be both
satisfied and dismayed with the current habeas system. On the one
hand, it might strike him as unsettling that a colorable claim of
innocence still does not justify habeas relief, and he would no doubt
find it surprising that the Court has held that there is not even a
right to test DNA evidence to prove one’s innocence.66 But on the
63. See Barnwell v. Lewis, Nos. 92-15458, 92-15459, 1993 WL 55199, at *5 n.2 (9th Cir.
Mar. 3, 1993) (Rymer, J., concurring); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Ill. 1996)
(stating the Herrera opinions are “conflicted,” but “[c]onflicted or not, at least for noncapital
cases, Herrera clearly states ... that a freestanding claim of innocence is not cognizable as a
fourteenth amendment [sic] due process claim”); Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, “Shifted
Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 291 (2012) (noting that with
regard to freestanding innocence “it has never been defined beyond a mere hypothetical
requiring a considerably high requisite showing. Second, both Herrera and Bell spoke of this
freestanding innocence claim specifically and only in the context of death penalty cases. While
a strong argument may be made to apply that reasoning to non-capital cases, the Supreme
Court has never done so: indeed, the Court has noted in other contexts the fundamental
difference in character between death and all other penalties.”). But see Tennison v. Henry,
No. 99-16362, 2000 WL 1844301 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2000) (applying Herrera in a non-capital
context).
64. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401.
65. The Court itself has acknowledged that its innocence doctrine is extremely limited and
largely unavailable. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (explaining that steps
have been taken “[t]o ensure that the ... exception would remain ‘rare’ and would only be
applied in the ‘extraordinary case’”). 
66. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55-56
(2009).
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other hand, Friendly was not an innocence crusader;67 he wanted
federal relief to be much rarer, and in this regard he would find
much to his liking in the modern reforms.68 Although innocence
remains an unlikely basis for obtaining relief, patent guilt has
emerged as a leading barrier to federal relief. This Section examines
the range of ways in which guilt has become dispositive as to
whether one is entitled to relief. Through a combination of subtle
and explicit doctrinal developments, guilt has been incorporated as
a threshold question of habeas eligibility in a variety of substantive
and procedural areas of law. 
1. Substantive Doctrines That Focus on Guilt
Whatever one may think about the rise of innocence-related
requirements in the context of procedural law, there is nothing
obvious about the link between questions of guilt and the merits of
a constitutional question.69 The Supreme Court itself has previously
explained that the vindication of a habeas claim ought to be permit-
ted “regardless of the ... apparent guilt of the offender.”70 In recent
decades, however, the prominence of the guilt-as-disqualifying-for-
relief approach has become increasingly entrenched.71
67. Some have noted that it was not innocence per se that Friendly was concerned with;
instead his primary concern was that guilty persons were eligible for habeas relief. See, e.g.,
DORSEN, supra note 7, at 214-15 (noting that Friendly tended to regard innocence as a nec-
essary but not a sufficient condition for relief); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 622. 
68. Professors Steikers have previously noted that Friendly’s call for an innocence-
centered federal habeas system resulted in both substantive and procedural reforms: 
Friendly’s exhortation fell on receptive ears on the Court, and the resulting
judicial reorientation of federal habeas law is well-known—and frequently
lamented by critics of capital punishment. While the Court did not directly
embrace potential innocence as a precondition for federal habeas relief, it
instead repeatedly tightened procedural requirements for federal habeas
petitions, allowing only few and narrow exceptions for the many petitioners who
failed to meet them—with innocence paramount among the exceptions.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 610 (footnote omitted).
69. Sussman, supra note 51, at 377-78.
70. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64
(1979); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“I am
aware that history reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas corpus to a constitutional claim
relating to innocence or guilt.”). 
71. Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker are some of the only scholars to emphasize the
evolution of substantive habeas doctrine in a way that limits relief for the guilty. Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 35, at 609-11.
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a. Strickland and Brady Claims
Two of the most commonly raised claims by prisoners seeking
federal habeas relief are Sixth Amendment claims pursuant to
Strickland v. Washington and due process claims based on Brady v.
Maryland.72 The litigation of these claims is substantially intermin-
gled with an assessment of how likely it is that the defendant is
actually guilty. Indeed, a primary defense by a State to a claim of
injury under these two lines of cases is to argue that, even assuming
the prisoner’s allegations are true, he is not entitled to relief
because the evidence of guilt is “overwhelming.” 
Consider first the familiar Sixth Amendment test for assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.73
First, there must be a showing that the attorney’s conduct fell below
a standard of reasonable professional conduct.74 Second, the
petitioner must show that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of
the ineffective assistance of counsel.75 To demonstrate prejudice he
must show more than that “errors had some conceivable effect on
the outcome of [the] proceeding[s],” and instead must make an
affirmative showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different.”76 Or, as the Court put it: “The bench-
mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
72. See KING ET AL., supra note 1, at 28, 30 (finding that 81 percent of capital cases include
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 43.1 percent include a claim relating to lost,
falsified, or undisclosed evidence by the prosecution); id. at 30 (showing that claims relating
to judicial comments to the jury or jury instructions are also common, occurring in about 68
percent of cases); see also JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKHOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL § 1.2 (2013) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most—if not the
most—common appeal grounds asserted by convicted criminal defendants as appellants.”);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth
Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1108 n.5 (2006) (“The three most common
species of claims in capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson claims,
and Brady claims.”).
73. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
74. Id. at 690.
75. Id. at 691-92.
76. Id. at 693-94.
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produced a just result.”77 Stated more directly, Strickland ’s
prejudice requirement typically requires that a prisoner present a
colorable challenge to the evidence of guilt that resulted in his
conviction; no matter how egregious the attorney’s conduct, the
prisoner is only entitled to relief if there is evidence “sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”78 And, significantly, the
prejudice determination is actually part of the right—that is, the
Constitution itself is understood to require a showing of prejudice. 
The effect of the prejudice prong, then, is to insulate attorney
errors from constitutional scrutiny in precisely those cases in which
a strong defense might be most important, when the prosecution has
a strong case.79 The examples of attorney errors that have been
forgiven under this constitutional standard because the trial record
as a whole provided overwhelming evidence of guilt are vast in
number and staggering in scope.80 Illustrative is Earl Washington’s
case.81 Washington’s lawyer failed to introduce evidence of exculpa-
tory semen stains, but in light of Washington’s own confessions, the
Fourth Circuit found that the overwhelming evidence of guilt
77. Id. at 686.
78. Id. at 694.
79. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV.
425, 427 (1996); Ira Mickenberg, Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is It Possible to
Keep Innocent People Off Death Row?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319, 323-24 (2004). Of course, it
cannot be gainsaid that a skilled lawyer might also make a positive difference for a guilty
defendant, but there is a reasoned basis for concluding that the right to counsel is, at bottom,
serving an innocence protecting function. Justin Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J.
2482 (2013).
80. As Anthony Amsterdam has put it:
I had always thought that Gideon v. Wainwright incorporated the Sixth
Amendment into the Fourteenth, but apparently I had that backward. According
to Strickland it is the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to a fair trial that gets
incorporated into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. And the test of fairness
is judicial satisfaction with the outcome. So if reviewing judges are comfortable
that a defendant is guilty and deserved the sentence he got, his lawyer’s failure
to come near meeting the minimum standards of professional performance
doesn’t violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to the assistance of
counsel for one’s defense.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
403, 408 (2004) (footnote omitted).
81. Professor Freedman has written a gripping insider’s account of this case. Eric M.
Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 1089 (2001); see also MARGARET
EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003).
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required it to deny relief under Strickland.82 Eventually DNA
evidence conclusively established Washington’s innocence and he
was exonerated, but because of the evidence of guilt on the face of
the trial record, Washington was ineligible for Strickland relief.83
Obviously, if the Strickland standard countenances a denial of relief
based on evidence of guilt when the defendant is actually innocent,
relief is extremely hard to come by for defendants who cannot
establish innocence. Unfortunately, examples abound where the
astonishing failures of counsel to adequately represent their client
are deemed constitutionally insignificant in our adversarial system
because the evidence of guilt put on by the prosecution was
sufficiently strong.84 
Similarly, Brady v. Maryland, which provides the constitutional
framework for challenging prosecutor misconduct in failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence, has an identical guilt-centered
limitation.85 It is difficult for prisoners to obtain relief—even in the
face of appalling prosecutor misconduct—unless they can undermine
the prosecution’s guilt-phase case because the Strickland standard
for prejudice is explicitly incorporated into the Brady analysis.86 In
defining prejudice for Brady purposes the Court held that “evidence
is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”87 And a “reasonable probability,” the
82. Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993). 
83. Id. Interestingly, Professor Garrett has done substantial research regarding wrongful
convictions and his impressive work has shown that in dozens of cases in which courts deny
relief because of “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” the defendant is actually innocent. See
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61, 107-11 (2008) (recognizing
that relief is regularly denied in cases of wrongful convictions because the errors were
harmless or the evidence of guilt too strong). 
84. See, e.g., Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 2013 WL
2096667 (2013); Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2010); Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d
1038 (9th Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1988) (denying sentencing
phase relief); see also Kirchmeier, supra note 79, at 426-27 (discussing lawyers using cocaine
during trial and similar ethical lapses); Mickenberg, supra note 79, at 319-20.
85. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 77.
87. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). For a lucid and useful examination
of how an analysis of Brady and Strickland prejudice should be integrated when a prisoner
raises both claims, see John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating
Bagley Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
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Court emphasized, “is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.”88 Indeed, scholars have recognized the link
between Brady claims and innocence, noting that the absence of a
clear right to litigate free-standing innocence on habeas has
resulted in Brady emerging as the “most common vehicle for
asserting an innocence claim in federal habeas.”89 And just as with
right to counsel claims, egregious acts of prosecutor misconduct will
not be regarded as running afoul of the Constitution so long as there
is strong evidence of guilt.90 
It is important to note that this focus on guilt as dispositive as to
the Constitution’s content and scope is not intuitive. Consider, for
example, the rule for assessing whether the Constitution was
violated by a defense lawyer’s representation of a defendant despite
the existence of a conflict.91 Prejudice is not required when a conflict
of interest is alleged.92 It is far from clear that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s promise of the “assistance of counsel” is more easily compro-
mised by a conflict of interest than sheer incompetence, and yet the
two doctrines developed along divergent paths. Whereas Strickland
(competence) violations require a showing of prejudice, Cuyler
(conflict) violations require only a showing of attorney error or
CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2005) (“Even in cases where the defendant alleges both that the
prosecution withheld evidence and that his counsel was incompetent, courts assess the impact
of each party’s conduct on the verdict independently. Our objectives here are two-fold. Our
more modest objective is to argue that courts should consider the impact of Brady violations
and Strickland violations together when evaluating whether a guilty verdict or death sentence
is reliable.”). 
88. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
89. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 1132.
90. A prime example of this post-hoc rationalization problem can be found in Strickler v.
Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). The prosecution’s lead witness—who was the only “disinterested”
witness presented by the prosecution—“testified in vivid detail” implicating David Strickler
in the kidnapping and murder of a college student. Id. at 266, 270-72, 293. Unknown to the
defense at trial, the prosecutor had possession of undisclosed, detailed notes from a detective
working on the case that impeached much of the witness’s testimony. Id. at 273-75. In
analyzing Strickler’s Brady claim on habeas review, the Court found that “[w]ithout a doubt,
[the witness’s] testimony was prejudicial in the sense that it made petitioner’s conviction more
likely than if she had not testified, and discrediting her testimony might have changed the
outcome of the trial.” Id. at 289. Nonetheless, brushing aside the prosecutor’s mis-
conduct—and its own recognition of prejudice—the Strickler Court held that “even without
the [witness] testimony, the evidence in the record was sufficient to establish petitioner’s guilt
on the murder charge.” Id. at 266.
91. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980).
92. Id. at 350.
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deficiency.93 There is nothing obvious about distinctions such as
these across claims arising under the same clause of the Sixth
Amendment, but the Supreme Court’s doctrine evolved such that
the most commonly litigated habeas claims cannot result in relief
unless the evidence of guilt was, in the first instance, underwhelm-
ing. As a result, the substance of the constitutional rights are
inseparable from questions of guilt and innocence. 
Guilt is often dispositive in finding no constitutional violation in
both the Strickland and the Brady contexts.94 Notably, both the
Strickland and the Brady prejudice standards emerged after
Friendly’s call for increased attention to innocence.95
b. Harmless Error
A close relative of the prejudice standard used to evaluate claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims is the harmless
error standard. Where harmless error applies, the doctrine ensures
that, even if a constitutional violation exists, relief is not available
unless the error undermined confidence in the guilty verdict.96 Thus,
even for those constitutional claims that do not require a showing
93. To be more precise, Cuyler holds that a showing of actual conflict and adverse impact
is required. Id. This is roughly translated as a showing of conflict and, in Strickland terms,
some deficient performance. The adverse impact requirement should not be conflated with the
more onerous and distinct requirement of prejudice under Strickland.
94. And it bears mentioning that the sort of guilt determinations relevant to this Article
are often predicated on a flawed trial record. As Justice Marshall noted:
On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court
confidently to ascertain how the government’s evidence and arguments would
have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are
exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be
missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense
counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Strickland was decided in 1984. See supra note 73.
96. There are two types of harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court has instructed
that a state court reviewing on direct appeal an allegation of constitutional error may only
treat the error as harmless if that court finds “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the verdict
was not impacted by the injury. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). By contrast,
on federal habeas review, federal courts are instructed to treat as harmless any error for
which the prisoner fails to demonstrate a “substantial and injurious” impact on the jury’s
verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
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of prejudice, a remedy is nonetheless unavailable if the error is
deemed harmless.97 
Notably, almost all constitutional errors are subject to harmless
error review.98 Only a handful of claims have been identified by the
Court as structural error—a constitutional violation that warrants
relief even without a harmless error analysis.99 Most constitutional
violations, including Miranda violations, improper identification
procedures, and even illegal searches are all subject to harmless
error review.100 Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v.
Fulminante that even a conviction resting upon a “coerced confes-
sion” was subject to harmless error review.101
In practice, this means that the strength of the evidence of guilt
against a defendant is almost always relevant to a consideration of
whether a constitutional violation warrants a remedy.102 Strong
97. For an insightful summary of harmless error law and a discussion of the role of guilt
in this doctrine, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (1995) (“At bottom, it is
impossible for an appellate judge to consider whether an error has influenced a jury without
thinking about the weight of the evidence against the defendant; and once an appellate judge
lapses into this mindset, it is difficult to avoid guilt-based decisionmaking.”).
98. The holding in Chapman—that most constitutional questions and not just technical,
non-constitutional procedural rules were subject to harmless error review—was regarded as
a monumental, progovernment change in the way constitutional rights were adjudicated. See,
e.g., David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 483; Jason S. Marks, Harmless Constitutional Error, Fundamental Fairness and
Constitutional Integrity, 8 CRIM. JUST. 2, 58 (1993) (“Harmless error appeared in our
jurisprudence seemingly without warning.”); James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such
Thing as a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU
J. PUB. L. 73, 77 (1997).
99. As one commentator explained:
The Supreme Court has recognized a narrow set of rights that, if denied, are
structural errors: the rights to counsel and to counsel of choice, the right of self-
representation, the right to an impartial judge, freedom from racial
discrimination in grand jury selection, the right to a public trial, and the right
to accurate reasonable-doubt jury instructions.
Kendra Oyer, Comment, Classifying Constructive Amendment as Trial or Structural Error,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 609, 612 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
100. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-54 (1970) (applying harmless error
to Fourth Amendment violations); Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1989)
(applying harmless error to Miranda violations); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona
v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 152, 153 (1991).
101. 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991) (referring to an involuntary confession as a “classic trial
error” that is subject to harmless error review and denying relief on this basis). 
102. As Judge Edwards explained, the risk with harmless error is that courts will simply
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evidence of guilt will routinely require a court to deny relief under
the harmless error doctrine.103 It is not the case that only “truly
trivial and technical failures to observe arcane procedural formali-
ties” are ignored when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.104
Instead, harmless error has become something approaching a
“blanket rule” for upholding convictions even for the “most obvious
and indefensible violations of basic constitutional guarantees” when
the evidence of guilt is strong.105 One need not take a normative
position opposing this development to recognize the prevalence of
guilt in constitutional adjudications. The Court itself has sought to
instruct lower courts that “most constitutional errors can be
harmless.”106
Moreover, the outer limits of the harmless error doctrine roughly
track those rights the Court has associated with innocence protec-
tion. For example, a violation of Gideon is deemed a structural
error, as is a biased judge, because such errors tend to suggest that
an innocent person may have been convicted.107 Perhaps even more
importantly, the nearly ubiquitous overlay of the harmless error
doctrine tends to set the tone for appellate and habeas review.
Anthony Amsterdam described the role of harmless error in setting
a general mood for judicial review: 
treat the weight of the evidence against a defendant as “the sole criterion by which
harmlessness is gauged.” Edwards, supra note 97, at 1187; see also id. (“All too often an
appellate court confuses review by applying the substantial evidence test to determine
whether an error is harmless. Such a court considers only the evidence in support of the
judgment and ignores erroneous matter. It assumes that the trier of fact, having decided
against the appellant, believed all properly admitted evidence against him and disbelieved
all evidence in his favor. No wonder that under such a review most errors are found
harmless.”) (quoting ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 28 (1970)).
103. This is not to suggest that the bounds of the harmless error doctrine map seamlessly
onto the definition of innocence. Those errors that do not require harmless error review—the
so-called structural errors—are difficult to neatly categorize. See, e.g., Amy Knights Burns,
Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV.
203, 217 (2013).
104. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 405; cf. Edwards, supra note 97, at 1205 (“In other
words, it is hard for a judge to discount a strong feeling that the defendant is guilty.”).
105. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 405.
106. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306.
107. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); see also Justin F. Marceau,
Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2484-85 (2013).
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In theory, the standard by which appellate courts are supposed
to test the harmlessness of most constitutional errors in the
pretrial process and at trial is whether the judges are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
the guilty verdict or the sentence. But in practice, it much more
often boils down to whether the appellate judges think that the
prosecution’s evidence of guilt was potent and the sentence well
deserved.108
c. AEDPA Deference Disadvantages the Guilty
For habeas petitions filed after the enactment of the AEDPA in
1996, the substantive standard for relief is notoriously high. A
prisoner generally must show that the state court adjudication of a
claim “involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established
law.109 A state court adjudication is said to be reasonable, and thus
insulated from federal relief, “so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could
disagree’” about the issue.110 Incorrect applications of the Constitu-
tion are not necessarily unreasonable for purposes of the AEDPA.111 
108. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 405-06 (footnotes omitted). Amsterdam goes on to
explain that:
When appellate judges decide to reject a claim of error on harmless-error
grounds, they very often do not say anything at all about the claim in their
opinion. When they do say that the claim has been considered and rejected on
harmless-error grounds, their explanation for why they regard any possible error
as harmless is ordinarily brief and unrevealing, often conclusionary, almost
always immune to criticism or review because it is case-specific and therefore
opaque to anyone not thoroughly familiar with the record of the particular case.
Id. at 406. These statements underscore the importance and under-recognized contribution
of Sherri Lynn Johnson’s efforts to examine the record of Fourth Circuit cases. See Johnson,
supra note 72.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). In rare circumstances the prisoner could also prevail by
showing that the state court decision was contrary to federal law then clearly established in
the holdings of the Supreme Court, or that the state court decision was based on unreasonable
determinations of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
These two avenues of substantive relief are even rarer than a showing of § 2254(d)(1)
unreasonableness. 
110. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
111. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Elaborating, the Court recently explained: 
Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal. As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from
a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the
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The AEDPA, then, makes relief rarer for all claims. But for claims
like Strickland and Brady the substantive focus on guilt is ampli-
fied.112 In describing the judicial review involved in adjudicating a
Strickland claim on federal habeas, the Supreme Court recently
explained:
Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task....
Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was
unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly
so.... Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of
equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonable-
ness under § 2254(d).113
In short, the Strickland standard’s performance and prejudice
standards are both amplified under § 2254(d)(1). Because these
doctrines emphasize the need for a showing of innocence even under
de novo review, the showing of innocence necessary to justify relief
is doubly high under AEDPA review.114 Bare prejudice, while not
requiring “a showing that counsel’s actions more likely than not
altered the outcome” will, in most cases, require something
claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
113. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. Because of the differences between the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of
Strickland, some clarification is necessary as to the notion that both receive “double”
deference under AEDPA. Given that the deficient performance prong turns on the judgments
of defense counsel, there is inherently some deference built into the analysis. Thus, when
AEDPA applies, the Court has fairly described the review of deficient performance claims as
doubly deferential. Of course, the prejudice prong is quite different. There is no first order
judgment by trial counsel that is merely receiving a second layer of deference under AEDPA.
Obviously, then, the initial review post-conviction judge reviewing such a claim does not have
anyone to defer to on this question of prejudice. Nonetheless, it is fair to describe the review
of a prejudice claim conducted by a federal habeas court as doubly deferential—there is
deference built into the prejudice analysis in the first order review, and then review under
AEDPA amplifies this deference. That is to say, although it might make more intuitive sense
to say that counsel’s decisions (deficient performance) get double deference—once by the state
court and once by the federal court—it is not inaccurate to think of the prejudice analysis as
being doubly deferential as well—one source of deference is the Strickland standard itself,
and the second is the standard of review announced in AEDPA.
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tantamount to a showing of “more-probable-than-not” that the
errors of counsel caused the guilty verdict.115 When this already
harsh prejudice standard is filtered through the AEDPA standard
of unreasonableness, the result is an intensified focus on innocence.
The most speculative evidence of guilt will, in many cases, justify a
denial of relief when the prejudice prong is adjudicated under the
AEDPA. Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself recognized that even
the barest “conventional circumstantial evidence” of guilt will
oftentimes suffice as a barrier to federal habeas relief under the
AEDPA.116
In addition, a quick survey of the cases in which relief has been
granted under the AEDPA tends to confirm that § 2254(d) en-
trenches the view that a guilt determination at trial is dispositive.
Emphasizing that the trial and the guilt determination ought to be
the “main event,”117 the Supreme Court’s AEDPA cases have
ensured that relief is almost never available, and when available, it
is almost always limited to a resentencing in a capital sentencing
case. The relief that is granted, then, has nothing to do with guilt or
innocence per se, but illustrates the absence of any prospect for
relief other than in the sentencing context where “death is differ-
ent.”
 Between 1996, when the AEDPA was enacted, and 2012, the
Supreme Court has addressed hundreds of habeas cases and found
the standard of review under § 2254(d) satisfied only seven times.118
None of these seven cases required a new guilt phase trial or so
much as called into question a guilty verdict.119 All of the cases
115. Harrington, 135 S. Ct.  at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id.
117. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
118. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 101-03 (2012) (compiling empirical data regarding the rate of relief
in habeas cases before the Supreme Court). 
119. In 2012, the Supreme Court granted guilt-phase relief for the first time under
§ 2254(d). Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012). However, even here the question
of guilt was not in dispute. The Court was considering whether the errors of counsel in failing
to advise the client to accept a guilty plea could be so prejudicial to his sentencing as to
require relief. Id. at 1384. That is to say, Lafler does not represent a true unsettling of a guilty
verdict insofar as the defendant still seeks to plead guilty. Moreover, and equally important,
relief was not actually ordered by the Court; instead, a remand was issued and the district
court was instructed to assess whether relief was required in its discretion. Id. at 1389
(“[When the sentence is higher because of a missed plea opportunity,] the court may conduct
2102 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
granting relief, then, are fundamentally cases about the appropriate
procedures for sentencing. Specifically, three of the seven cases
involve the Eighth Amendment requirement that the sentencer in
a capital case be able to consider and give effect to all potentially
mitigating evidence before deciding on the appropriate sentence.120
In each of these three cases, the only issue was whether the State
had impermissibly impinged the defendant’s ability to present and
have considered mitigating evidence that might justify a sentence
other than death. The conviction itself was not in question. Simi-
larly, in the other four cases granting relief under § 2254(d)(1), the
Court found that the heightened importance of a capital sentencing
proceeding justified unique requirements on defense counsel such
that ineffective assistance of counsel was easier to establish.121
To put the matter as plainly as possible, the only cases in which
relief was granted were those in which the only issue in dispute was
the sentence—specifically a death sentence—and, as for the
conviction, § 2254(d) effectively defers to the guilt and the trial
proceedings such that relief is not available.122
In short, the reforms of the AEDPA and § 2254(d) in particular
tend to reinforce the guilt-as-dispositive orientation of modern
habeas review. The deferential standard of review forces even more
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s errors he would have accepted the plea [and] [i]f the showing
is made, the court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should
receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received
at trial, or something in between.”) (emphasis added). In short, a constitutional violation
under Lafler may, in the trial court’s discretion, result in no remedy at all. And at bottom, a
Lafler claim is a sentencing claim. Id. at 1385 (defining the prejudice inquiry as “a reasonable
probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant
would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than
under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed”).
120. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 260 (2007) (“[T]he jury must be permitted
to ‘consider fully’ such mitigating evidence and that such consideration ‘would be meaningless’
unless the jury not only had such evidence available to it, but also was permitted to give that
evidence meaningful, mitigating effect in imposing the ultimate sentence.” (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 321, 323 (2002))); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796-804 (2001)
(mitigating evidence instruction); see also Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 292-96 (2007).
121. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40-41 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-35 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 413-15 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
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attention to the prejudice prongs of constitutional claims, thereby
amplifying the implausibility of relief in the absence of strong
evidence of innocence. In addition, the Supreme Court’s own
application of § 2254(d) has evinced a willingness to tolerate relief
only when guilt is assumed and the only question is whether a
death sentence is the appropriate punishment. The scarcity of relief
and the severity of the standard of review allow federal judges to
deny relief to the guilty; indeed the AEDPA oftentimes seems to
require it. 
2. Procedures That Focus on Guilt
As explained immediately above, a number of substantive
doctrines have emerged that tend to curb access to habeas relief
when the defendant cannot rebut his conviction with sufficient
proof.123 Various procedural hurdles, however, make it difficult for
prisoners even to reach the substance of their constitutional claim,
and, increasingly, the procedures precluding substantive review are
grounded in concerns about benefitting the guilty.124 This Part
discusses some of the key procedural limits and analyzes their
relationship to precluding relief for the guilty. The claim is not that
all features of habeas procedure filter litigation into an innocence-
only posture;125 however, the scope and range of critical habeas
123. See supra Part II.B.1.
124. As Amsterdam has described procedural habeas rules, “They are intricately
labyrinthine, and so confusing that courts today devote ten times as much labor, intelligence,
and prose to deciding whether they can hear a convicted person’s constitutional claims at all
as they devote to considering the merits of such claims.” Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 409. 
125. Although Friendly did not succeed in directly orienting habeas to innocence
exclusively, he has achieved substantial indirect success. As explained in the text, his critique
of expansive federal habeas review spurred a number of procedural limits. See supra Part I.B.
These procedural limits have, in turn, drastically curtailed the number of prisoners who
succeed in obtaining relief on federal habeas review. See supra note 1. And, now, in the face
of such overwhelming statistics, leading habeas scholars Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann
have argued that because finding a meritorious habeas claim is like finding a needle in a
haystack, all noncapital habeas relief should be barred except for those who are innocent. See
NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES,
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 67-86 (2011). In light of the procedural reforms
triggered by projects like Friendly’s, this new wave of scholars is advocating for what Friendly
could not do directly. But see John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In
Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435
(2011).
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procedural law that is linked to innocence is significant and
provides substantial support for the claim that habeas has shifted
far afield from the time when innocence was arguably irrelevant.126
a. The Stone v. Powell Limit
Few Supreme Court decisions more dramatically reflect the shift
away from constitutional adjudication and toward an innocence
orientation than Stone v. Powell.127 Likewise, few Supreme Court
decisions have marked such a resounding adoption of a scholarly
agenda than Stone v. Powell’s implementation of Friendly’s
innocence-focused notion of habeas.128 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, held that Fourth Amendment violations are generally not
cognizable on federal habeas.129 Powell’s reasoning for such a
conclusion was clear: because Fourth Amendment “claims ... rarely
bear on innocence” they are not well suited for federal habeas
review.130 Habeas corpus, in other words, should be directed toward
126. Although Garrett and others have persuasively argued that innocence remains
substantially irrelevant to the nuts and bolts of habeas litigation, see, e.g., Garrett, supra
note 59, at 1684-99, it is “commonly, indeed virtually universally, believed that emphasis
on the possible execution of the innocent is the best strategy to broadly reform or even to
abolish the death penalty.” Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 607. Exploiting the public’s
“reflexive revulsion” at the prospect of punishing the innocent, it has become commonplace
for the defense bar to focus on innocence as a justification for criminal justice reforms. Id.
at 596. The “innocence revolution,” through its prioritization of innocence, has itself spur-
red, entrenched, and legitimized some of the procedural limits discussed in this section. Id.
at 607.
127. 428 U.S. 465 (1976); see also Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great
Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 624 (1994) (“The emphasis on ‘factual innocence’ is easily traceable
to the Court’s milestone decision in Stone v. Powell, wherein the majority held that resort to
habeas corpus should be limited primarily to protect the innocent.”). 
128. Stone, 428 U.S. at 480 n.13, 489-95 (citing Friendly, supra note 4).
129. Id. at 494.
130. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Commentators have taken note of the fact that Justice Powell was less explicit in his majority
opinion in Stone. For example, Barry Friedman has explained that:
Unfortunately for the coherent development of doctrine, Justice Powell said all
of this in footnotes, while at the same time denying that he was making a
statement about habeas at all. The body of the Stone decision reads like a
Fourth Amendment case, all full of balancing the deterrent value of excluding
evidence against the cost to society of doing so. The entire discussion regarding
habeas corpus comes in footnotes 31 and 35 of the decision.
Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
485, 513 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
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ensuring that “no innocent man suffers an unconstitutional loss of
liberty.” Under this view, because Fourth Amendment violations do
not typically result in the punishment of innocents, habeas corpus
relief is undesirable.131 
In the view of the Stone Court, because the enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment on federal habeas does not serve the “ultimate
question of guilt or innocence” it is not cognizable on federal habeas
review.132 Such a holding largely parrots Friendly’s insight that
“simply because a claim can be characterized as ‘constitutional’, it
should not necessarily constitute a basis for” relief in the absence of
a colorable showing of innocence.133 Indeed, Friendly had specifically
identified Fourth Amendment litigation in his article as a category
of constitutional challenges for which habeas relief should not be
permitted because the constitutional error almost never leads to the
“conviction of an innocent man.”134 Accordingly, leading scholars
have regarded Stone as evincing the “view that habeas relates
primarily to innocence” and have explained that this conception
“was apparently borrowed from Judge Friendly.”135
The Court’s wholesale abandonment of an entire class of constitu-
tional violations is illustrative of the shift toward a more innocence-
oriented and less constitutional-right-oriented model of federal
habeas review.136 Indeed, in rejecting an argument that sufficiency
of the evidence claims should be precluded on federal habeas review
based on the reasoning of Stone, the Court emphasized that
sufficiency of evidence claims, unlike Fourth Amendment claims,
131. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring); Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1086 (1977) (“Stone v. Powell viewed the central function of habeas corpus as protection
of innocent defendants from unconstitutional denials of their liberty.”). 
132. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490; see also Friedman, supra note 10, at 284 (“Justice Powell, who
wrote the Stone opinion, consistently ... cited Stone in subsequent decisions to support a guilt-
related interpretation of habeas jurisdiction.”).
133. Friendly, supra note 4, at 156. 
134. Id. at 162-63. 
135. Friedman, supra note 130, at 513 n.184; see also Friedman, supra note 10, at 279
(“Stone is consistent with the guilt-related theory because ... evidence seized unlawfully is
nonetheless probative of guilt.”).
136. It is worth noting that the Court has refused to extend the Stone limitation to other
instances in which the constitutional claim in question is unrelated to innocence. See, e.g.,
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1986); see also id. at 391 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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adhere to the principle that guilt is dispositive. The Court ex-
plained: “The constitutional issue presented in this case is far
different from the kind of issue that was the subject of the Court’s
decision in Stone v. Powell. The question whether a defendant has
been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic
question of guilt or innocence.”137 The centrality of guilt and
innocence identified by the Court reflects a critical, if nonubiqui-
tous, feature of modern habeas.
b. The Teague Limit
Historically, new rules of law applied to all cases regardless of
their procedural posture;138 however, under Teague v. Lane, with
two narrow exceptions, a new rule of constitutional law does not
apply to a case that is on federal habeas review.139 The exceptions
to nonretroactivity are substantive rules and watershed rules of
procedure.140 By limiting the retroactive application of legal
decisions to substantive changes and watershed rules of procedure,
the Court has enshrined innocence protection at the expense of
procedural safeguards.141 As explained below, the very ability of a
court to pronounce “new” law is, under Teague, wedded to innocence.
First, a rule is “substantive rather than procedural if it alters the
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”142
Stated more directly, a new substantive rule provides a basis for
relief because the prisoner is actually not guilty of a crime.143 The
137. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (internal citation omitted).
138. BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 26:1 (2013); Note, Retroactivity and the
Exclusionary Rule: A Unifying Approach, 97 HARV. L. REV. 961, 961 (1984) (“Before [Linkletter
v. Walker], the Court would generally give full retroactive effect to its constitutional
pronouncements. Linkletter rejected this blanket rule of retroactivity in favor of a balancing
approach.”) (footnote omitted). 
139. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-11 (1989) (plurality opinion). Although Teague
ushered in an era of more rigid, formalized rules for retroactivity, the Supreme Court had
approved a limited form of retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965). 
140. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
141. For a more detailed examination of the link between Teague and innocence, see
Marceau, supra note 107, at 2488. 
142. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
143. For a useful discussion of the distinction between substantive and procedural rules,
see MEANS, supra note 138, § 26:5, at 998-99 (“The category of substantive rules encompasses
not only those rules forbidding punishment of certain primary conduct, but also rules
prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status
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crime for which the individual was convicted either cannot be
enforced at all or cannot be enforced for the conduct at issue in his
case.144 In other words, by allowing substantive rules to apply
retroactively, the Court has tailored habeas relief to the protection
of the innocent; if the new substantive law does not permit a
conviction, then habeas relief is available.145 
Likewise, by limiting the scope of retroactivity for procedural
rules, the Court has signaled the prioritization of innocence-related
litigation. Procedural rules are those rules that govern the manner
of ascertaining guilt, rather than the fact of guilt.146 The Supreme
Court has held that almost no procedural rules are sufficiently
linked to innocence to justify retroactive application. Only those
procedures that are so essential to the accuracy of the verdict—that
is, those rules “that protect[ ] the innocence-serving function of the
trial”—will be applied retroactively.147 The Court has recognized
only one such procedural rule: the requirement of counsel for any
defendant charged with a felony enumerated in Gideon v. Wain-
wright.148 And the Court explained that it is unlikely that any other
rules of procedure are sufficiently linked to innocence as to deserve
retroactive application.149 One can quarrel about whether Gideon
has had the effect of better protecting the innocent on the ground,
but the Court has emphasized that it is the accuracy and innocence
protecting functions of Gideon that justify treating the rule as
retroactive.150
Simply put, the retroactivity doctrine reflects the doctrinal shift
in habeas litigation away from procedures and pure rights-based
litigation in favor of an innocence orientation. Only those issues of
or offense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 999.
145. The Supreme Court has explained the exception to the general bar on retroactivity for
substantive rules by noting that such a rule is designed to protect the innocent from
punishment. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (observing that if
a substantive rule did not apply retroactively there would be a “significant risk that a
defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
146. MEANS, supra note 138, § 26:5, at 999 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354).
147. Marceau, supra note 107, at 2488.
148. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (recognizing Gideon as the “only case”
that has satisfied the watershed rule exception).
149. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 n.7 (2001).
150. Marceau, supra note 107, at 2488.
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law with a direct connection to innocence can be applied retroac-
tively to a case on federal habeas. As the Court has put it, a rule is
regarded as a watershed only if it implicates “the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”151
c. Successive Petitions Limit
Weaving the postconviction needle between the requirement to
fully exhaust claims in state court and the one-year federal habeas
statute of limitations is difficult even for experienced habeas
lawyers. Doing so while pro se, as most habeas petitioners are,
borders on impossible.152 Because they are unable to competently
exhaust or raise all claims before the statute of limitations runs,
vindicating material constitutional violations will, at least in some
cases, involve the prisoner seeking to file a second habeas petition
after his first petition has already been submitted. The rules are
unforgiving to prisoners caught in this dilemma. There is no right
to amend a pending petition to add unrelated claims.153 And the
filing of a second petition is strictly circumscribed. 
Specifically, the AEDPA provides that “[a] claim ... that was
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”154 For claims
that have not previously been presented, federal habeas courts may
151. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added); see Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (holding
that a rule is not retroactive unless its relation to the accuracy of the verdict is “direct and
profound”). 
152. Recently, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of
limitations for prisoners who are actually innocent. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924,
1936 (2013). One can applaud the equities of this decision while also recognizing that it
further entrenches the innocent/guilty dichotomy on federal habeas. Only those prisoners who
are guilty are subject to an onerous statute of limitations.
153. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006). One notable exception to the general rule that a claim
raised in a habeas petition can never be raised again is recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Under Slack, when a prisoner’s claim is denied without a merits
determination, for example for a procedural default or statute of limitations violation, the
prisoner can challenge this previous ruling that resulted in a denial of relief without a merits
adjudication. Id. That is to say, when a federal court has not previously resolved a claim “on
the merits,” a subsequent effort to obtain relief on that claim is generally not a successive
petition. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 & n.4 (2005). Subsequent cases have
also acknowledged that not every habeas petition that is technically successive, or second in
time, is treated as a second or successive petition. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930 (2007).
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not exercise jurisdiction over a claim unless the claim meets one of
two narrow exceptions:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
  (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.155
New claims that were not raised in the first habeas petition, then,
can be raised only if the prisoner can assert a “new rule of constitu-
tional law,” or a claim of innocence by “clear and convincing
evidence.” Notably for the reasons discussed above regarding
Teague, only a prisoner with a claim of innocence will have a viable
opportunity to file a successive petition.156 The “new rule” prong has
proven illusory because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
there are not likely to be many new rules of constitutional law
announced.157 In addition, if such a rule happened to exist, the
statute of limitations would almost certainly render the successive
petition untimely.158
Accordingly, a prisoner needing to file a second habeas petition is
forced into innocence litigation. And this is innocence litigation at
its very worst. The prisoner must not show that there was in fact
reasonable doubt or that he was likely innocent, but rather he must
demonstrate innocence to a trial court judge by clear and convincing
evidence.159 That is to say, the court must find the defendant
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
156. Supra Part II.B.2.b.
157. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417-18.
158. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 677 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
159. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 411 (calling this the squeaky clean standard—unless
you can show by “clear and convincing” evidence that you did not commit the crime, you are
not permitted to file a petition).
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innocent by clear and convincing evidence to even exercise jurisdic-
tion over a claim. 
Moreover, this harsh burden of proof tends to understate the
severity of this form of innocence-focused habeas as it is applied by
federal courts. A recent federal appeal in the Tenth Circuit is
illustrative. In Case v. Hatch the prisoner was forced to bring a
Brady claim in a second habeas petition,160 and, thus, was con-
fronted with the onerous standards discussed above. Because Brady
is not a new rule of law, the only way for Case to have the egregious
act of prosecutor misconduct vindicated was to prove his
innocence.161 Remarkably, Case succeeded.162 The district court
found that Case had proved his innocence by clear and convincing
evidence, as required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).163 However, writing for
a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Tymkovich adopted a very
narrow reading of the statute and reversed the district court.164
Significantly, the appellate court did not reverse the finding of
innocence. Instead the court insisted that only innocence that was
proved based on evidence relating to the underlying claim would
suffice.165 Relying on the text of § 2244,166 the court of appeals held
that new DNA evidence and recantations that resulted in the
innocence determination by clear and convincing evidence could not
be considered.167 Specifically, the court held that only evidence
directly linked to the constitutional error—the Brady mate-
rial—could be considered in determining whether a prisoner
established his innocence.168
160. 708 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir. 2013).
161. The Brady evidence was sufficiently significant to justify a retrial. See Case v. Hatch,
773 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1148-49 (D.N.M. 2011), vacated, 708 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2013), vacated
on reh’g, No. 11-2094, 2013 WL 1501521 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 2013).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1092, 1129.
164. Case, 708 F.3d at 1170 (10th Cir. 2013), vacated on reh’g, No. 11-2094, 2013 WL
1501521 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 2013).
165. Id. at 1170, 1173-75.
166. The statute provides that a second petition is permitted if the “facts underlying the
claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
167. Case, 708 F.3d at 1179.
168. Id. at 1170.
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Innocence, then, has become a touchstone of habeas litigation for
the thousands of prisoners each year who need to file a second
habeas petition because, for example, the evidence suppressed by
the prosecution was not available at the time the first petition was
filed. But the form of innocence litigation that has emerged is so
cramped that even a prisoner found to be innocent may not be
entitled to have his habeas claims heard. It is innocence modified by
a nearly insurmountable burden of proof, and cabined, at least in
the Tenth Circuit, in procedural rules that make proving innocence
cruelly insufficient. Innocence is necessary but often entirely
insufficient as a basis for even affording the federal courts jurisdic-
tion. 
A second line of cases similarly illustrates the harsh innocence
focus of the successive petition limits. It is unconstitutional to
execute a prisoner who has been deemed mentally retarded.169 In a
sense, one who is mentally retarded is ineligible for the death
penalty and, thus, innocent of the death penalty.170 Recently, the
Eleventh Circuit confronted the question of whether clear evidence
of mental retardation justified permitting the prisoner to file a
second habeas petition, and the court squarely held that mental
retardation was insufficiently linked to innocence so as to justify a
successive petition.171 Even as one of the rare class of rules that
qualifies for retroactive application, the mental retardation
exception to the death penalty was regarded as an insufficient basis
169. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
170. But see Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329,
330-31 (2010) (stating that a death-ineligibility collateral challenge does not derive from
actual innocence but from the unconstitutionality of the capital sentence under the Eighth
Amendment).
171. In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 299 (11th Cir. 2013); see also id. at 302 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (“The idea that courts are not permitted to acknowledge that a mistake has been
made which would bar an execution is quite incredible for a country that not only prides itself
on having the quintessential system of justice but attempts to export it to the world as a
model of fairness.”). It is worth noting that a group of habeas scholars filed an amicus brief
requesting that the Supreme Court grant an original writ of habeas corpus so as to avoid the
unconstitutional execution. See Brief of Law Professors Eric M. Freedman & Brandon L.
Garrett et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 8, In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284 (11th Cir.
2013) (No. 12-10469), available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/news/Hill-SCOTUS-
Amicus.pdf; see also Ellen Kreitzberg & Linda Carter, Innocent of a Capital Crime: Parallels
Between Innocence of a Crime and Innocence of the Death Penalty, 42 TULSA L. REV. 437, 448
n.64 (2006) (citing cases in which the court held that mental retardation is not an element of
a capital offense and placed the burden of proof on the defendant).
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for permitting a second or successive federal petition. Specifically,
the court of appeals concluded that the prisoner’s mental retarda-
tion relates only to “his eligibility for a death sentence, and not
whether he is ‘guilty of the underlying offense,’ and thus does not”
justify a successive habeas petition.172 The court stressed that
because the petitioner was “guilty of the underlying offense,” a
successive petition was barred.173 Under this rule, a prisoner who
cannot be constitutionally executed is nonetheless barred from
preventing his execution unless he can independently show he was
innocent of the crime.174
The rules governing successive habeas petitions, an integral part
of habeas litigation for prisoners who discover new evidence
supporting a constitutional claim well after their conviction, are
wedded to innocence. The fact of a prisoner’s likely, or even
potential, guilt, bars the litigation of colorable, never-before-
litigated questions regarding the constitutionality of one’s sentence
or conviction. These limits were unknown at the time of Judge
Friendly’s call for a greater focus on innocence, but they have
emerged as one of the most insurmountable limits on federal habeas
relief.175 
172. In re Hill, 715 F.3d at 285 (beginning the decision with the heading, “Malice Murder
Conviction and Unanimous Death Sentence”).
173. Id. at 296-97 (emphasizing that “ ‘[g]uilty’ means ‘[h]aving committed a crime’” and
thus noting that mental retardation is irrelevant) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (9th
ed. 2009)); id. at 301 (holding that the innocence required to file a successive petition under
AEDPA does not include “actual innocence of the death penalty” under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505
U.S. 333 (1992)).
174. Id. at 297 (“We are unable to transmute a claim that a petitioner is not eligible for a
capital sentence into a claim that the petitioner is not guilty of the underlying offense.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Schwab, 531 F.3d 1365,
1366-67 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting successive petition when the claims only go to the propriety
of a death sentence rather than the question of guilt); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 326 (4th
Cir. 2005) (“The state does not have a corollary duty to prove that a defendant is ‘not retarded’
in order to be entitled to the death penalty”); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (5th Cir.
2003) (denying authorization to file a successive habeas petition because “Johnson’s
application does not state a prima facie case of mental retardation under Atkins, which this
court stated is simply a showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller explanation by the
district court”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see State v. Jimenez,
880 A.2d 468, 483-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (concluding as a matter of state law that
mental retardation may bar capital punishment, making it the functional equivalent of an
element of the offense), rev’d, 908 A.2d 181 (N.J. 2006).
175. Prior to the strict bar on successive petitions, the Court had created an “abuse of the
writ” limitation. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470, 489 (1991); see also Slack v. McDaniel,
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d. Limited Factual Development Under § 2254(e)(2)
Factual development in support of a claim of constitutional error
is essential to obtaining federal habeas relief.176 Yet, in a broad and
expanding range of circumstances, the ability of prisoners to develop
these new facts is circumscribed by an innocence-centered frame-
work.177 Under § 2254(e)(2), prisoners who did not develop facts in
state court are barred from factual development in federal court
unless:
(A) the claim relies on— 
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or 
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.178
In other words, any prisoner wishing to develop new facts must
establish his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Clearly
then, factual development in support of a claim is expressly
precluded for the guilty.
The impact of precluding factual development for federal habeas
claims can hardly be overstated, and linking factual development of
evidence to innocence renders the vast majority of claims ineligible
for additional factual development. Although the innocence limits
of § 2254(e)(2) only apply to petitioners who “failed” to develop the
529 U.S. 473, 480-82 (2000) (discussing the link between pre- and post-AEDPA doctrine in
this field).
176. See, e.g.,  Justin F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2)
and (e)(1), 82 TUL. L. REV. 385, 391 (2007). 
177. The leading habeas treatise optimistically concludes that AEDPA places constitutional
violations at the top of the reviewability “hierarchy” and determinations of factual questions
at the “bottom.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 46, at 100-01. The only citation for this
proposition is the text of § 2254, which first specifies that only “constitutional violations” give
rise to relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006), and then discusses factual litigation on habeas
toward the bottom of the statute, § 2254(e). 
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
2114 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
facts in state court,179 in recent years courts brazenly attributed
fault to a prisoner for failing to present facts in state court when the
fault lies with defective—or nonexistent—postconviction counsel or
with arcane and generally ignored procedural rules.180 Thus, the
application of § 2254(e)(2) is expanding such that innocence plays an
increasingly critical role in the crucial element of factual develop-
ment on federal habeas review. 
e. Procedural Default
Another illustrative example of the sort of procedural rules that
have developed rendering the guilty ineligible for habeas relief is
the procedural default doctrine.181 Procedural default is one of the
most common barriers to relief in modern habeas practice. When a
claim is not fully exhausted in state court, when an appeal is not
timely filed in state court, or when a state procedural rule is not
strictly followed, a federal constitutional violation is said to be
procedurally defaulted such that a federal court is precluded from
granting relief.182
The purpose of the procedural default doctrine is to ensure that
the guilt phase trial is the “main event” by precluding federal review
of claims that are not properly or fully presented in state court.183
But one can agree with the underlying purposes of the doc-
trine—giving force to state procedural rules—and still candidly
acknowledge that its exceptions are rooted in concerns about guilt
and innocence. Once a claim is procedurally defaulted, for any
reason, the litigation path to overcome the default is steeped in
questions of guilt and innocence. 
179. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000) (“The purpose of the fault component of
‘failed’ is to ensure the prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence.”).
180. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (“In the absence of a
constitutional violation, the petitioner bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney errors
made in the course of the representation.”).
181. MEANS, supra note 138, § 24:3, at 681 (“[A] prisoner who fails to satisfy the state
procedural requirements forfeits his right to present his claim in federal habeas.”).
182. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (“[P]etitioner contested
his sentence on appeal, but did not challenge the validity of his plea. In failing to do so,
petitioner procedurally defaulted [his] claim.”).
183. MEANS, supra note 138, § 24:2, at 665 (“The paradigm case is one in which a prisoner
fails to comply with a state procedural rule and the state courts decline, for that reason, to
reach the merits of federal claims that would otherwise be presented.”).
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Leading habeas scholars have observed that the “rare exceptions
to this rule precluding postconviction relief for constitutional
violation are ... result-oriented inquiries.”184 Indeed, the most
common way to argue that a procedural default ought not apply is
for the prisoner to demonstrate “cause and prejudice.”185 Notably,
the prejudice analysis in this context, no less than in the Strickland
and Brady contexts, is a ready “device for telling judges to decline
to entertain constitutional claims unless they are convinced that a
criminal conviction was undeserved because of the defendant’s
likely innocence.”186 
The prejudice analysis functions such that strong evidence of guilt
precludes relief. Indeed, evidence of guilt even precludes the habeas
court from reaching the merits of the constitutional claim.187 The
effect of the procedural default doctrine’s cause and prejudice
inquiry is to convert all claims, even those fundamentally untether-
ed from concerns of guilt, to a Strickland-type, guilt-as-dispositive
model.188 As Amy Knight Burns has observed, when it comes to
structural errors—a class of cases for which it is impossible to
demonstrate harm to the accuracy of the trial—the procedural
default doctrine has the nonsensical effect of requiring a showing of
prejudice for these claims.189 A constitutional claim that necessarily
has nothing to do with guilt or innocence, for example a Batson
claim (a claim that the jury selection process was tainted with
impermissible race or gender bias),190 is rendered impossible to
vindicate by the guilt orientation of the procedural default
doctrine.191 So the procedural default doctrine functions such that
184. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 411.
185. Id. at 414.
186. Id. at 411.
187. See supra note 181.
188. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
189. See Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors,
Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 STAN. L. REV. 727 (2012); see also Justin F.
Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1161, 1197-1200, 1216-17 (2012) (explaining that postconviction relief based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing of prejudice “on the outcome of the
individual trial” and explaining the importance of effective counsel to prevent pretrial errors,
which may “not directly implicate the fairness of the trial itself”).
190. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-100 (1986). 
191. Burns, supra note 189, at 740 (“Batson claims represent an uncomfortable fit with a
harmless error regime because requiring proof of a different outcome would entail the court
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certain rights that are unconcerned with questions of guilt and
innocence are rendered impossible to vindicate—that is, a procedur-
ally defaulted structural error is not cognizable on federal habeas
review under existing doctrine.192 The takeaway, then, is that for
some important but non-guilt-related rights, the cause and prejudice
requirement makes vindicating these rights impossible. 
It must be recognized that there is an exception to the rigorous
cause and prejudice standard, but the exception is even more
explicitly linked to innocence. The only accepted alternative to the
cause and prejudice requirement is a so-called “miscarriage of
justice” exception.193 Recently the Court has regarded only one thing
as a miscarriage of justice: the conviction of an innocent person.194
Apparently, no patent violation of a criminal procedure right rises
to the level of a miscarriage of justice. 
However noble its underlying purposes, procedural default is yet
another doctrine that feeds the federal habeas preoccupation with
guilt. For one against whom there is strong evidence of guilt, the
constitutional violations become substantially, if not entirely,
irrelevant.195
doing exactly what it has forbidden the lawyers to do: making an inference about how jurors
would decide a case based on their race.”); id. at 749 (“A trial error might be salvageable via
the cause and prejudice exception, but a structural error never is, because structural errors
by definition cannot give rise to a showing of actual prejudice. They are thus doomed to fail
this test in every instance.”).
192. But see id. at 753 (noting a “circuit split on the question of presuming Strickland
prejudice for structural errors” and arguing that prejudice should be presumed for defaulted
structural errors); Marceau, supra note 189 (arguing that recent changes to substantive
ineffective assistance of counsel law ought to be imported to the procedural default realm so
as to allow for the vindication of defaulted structural errors). 
193. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992).
194. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 411 (“[C]ourts today believe that the only miscarriage
of criminal justice is the conviction of somebody who was [not] involved in any way in the
crime.”). During the Warren era the miscarriage of justice concept appears to have enjoyed
a more robust meaning. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 558-60 (1953) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (using miscarriage of justice in a manner consistent with recognizing the need
for relief from procedural errors); Berkowitz, supra note 7, at 495 (“It is the unfairness
associated from errors of procedure that is considered to be an injustice.”); id. at 497 (noting
that some of the key Justices from Brown v. Allen regarded procedural errors as sufficient to
constitute a miscarriage of justice). 
195. A survey of the connection between procedural default litigation and innocence would
be incomplete if it failed to acknowledge that in Dretke v. Haley the Supreme Court held that
arguments regarding cause and prejudice or litigation regarding nondefaulted claims must
proceed before litigation of an actual innocence exception to the procedural default rule. 541
U.S. 386, 392-96 (2004).
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f. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations
As discussed below, non-innocence based equitable tolling of the
AEDPA statute of limitations has been permitted in certain
narrowly defined circumstances.196 Still, for the vast majority of
prisoners the statute of limitations will not yield to generic claims
of inequity. It will be the rare prisoner who is able to mount a
sufficient record to justify equitable tolling.197
There is, however, one general exception to the statute of
limitations: those who are not guilty need not comply with the one-
year statute of limitations. This is yet another example of how the
doctrine has evolved to promote the primacy of a guilt-as-dispositive
model of habeas adjudication. 
As the previous discussion in this Article and other scholarly
works make clear, remarkably little of the pre-AEDPA procedural
landscape has survived the AEDPA revolution. The AEDPA
rendered most of the defaults and prior procedures for federal
habeas review obsolete and irrelevant. The rules for factual
development—with or without an evidentiary hearing—have
entirely changed,198 the standard of review for such claims is
unrecognizable when compared to the pre-AEDPA review,199 the
current standard for reviewing successive petitions bears little
resemblance to the pre-AEDPA standard,200 and so on. And yet, in
the face of a procedural revolution by the AEDPA, the innocence
exception remains unaltered. As the Court explained in McQuiggin
v. Perkins, the innocence exception “survived AEDPA’s passage
intact and unrestricted.”201
The primacy of innocence adjudications, then, is one of the rare
constants from pre- to post-AEDPA. Few procedures remain intact,
much less unrestricted, in light of the AEDPA. This led Jordan
196. See infra Part III.
197. As explained below, the requirements for equitable tolling in this context are
seemingly beyond the reach of all but the rarest of prisoners. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2549, 2564-65 (2010) (explaining the unique factual situation justifying equitable tolling). 
198. Compare Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-18 (1963), with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
(2006). 
199. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with Brown, 344 U.S. at 460-65.
200. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244, with Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449-51, 454
(1986).
201. 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 (2013).
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Steiker to aptly refer to innocence as the one “get-out-of-habeas-
procedure-free” card.202 Like many of the doctrines discussed in this
Section, the practical effect is that the guilty (or not clearly inno-
cent) will languish under insurmountable procedural barriers. But
for those who can muster a sufficiently strong showing of innocence,
federal courts will consider the merits of the underlying constitu-
tional claim. Innocence, again, is a necessary but insufficient
condition for habeas relief. 
g. Habeas Relief Based on Non-Constitutional Errors
The writ of habeas corpus in America has long been defined by
the statutes of this country as available for prisoners who can show
that they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.”203 Thus, it would seem that just as a
conviction predicated on an unconstitutional process can give rise
to habeas relief, so too could a conviction that rests on a violation of
federal law or a treaty. The Supreme Court, however, has abridged
this clear statutory authority and held that a violation of federal law
can only serve as a predicate for habeas relief if the error in
question amounts to “a fundamental defect which inherently results
in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”204 
Stated more directly, the circumstances when a violation of
federal, non-constitutional law may give rise to habeas relief are
extraordinarily rare. As for errors that are inconsistent with
rudimentary demands of fair procedure, such as the watershed rules
of procedure under Teague, this exception seems to be substanceless
verbiage.205 That is to say, short of defects of the magnitude of a
202. Jordan Steiker, Opinion Analysis: Innocence Exception Survives, Innocence Claim Does
Not, SCOTUSBLOG (May 29, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/opinion-
analysis-innocence-exception-survives-innocence-claim-does-not/.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2241(c)(3). 
204. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (“In
Hill v. United States, for example, we held that collateral relief is not available when all that
is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of a rule of criminal procedure
in the absence of any indication that the defendant was prejudiced by the asserted technical
error.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
205. In announcing the standard, some courts do not even mention the potential for habeas
relief for statutory violations unrelated to miscarriages of justice. See, e.g., Miller v. United
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Gideon violation, the Court simply does not recognize rudimentary
or fundamental fairness as having been implicated.206 Likewise, the
question of whether there is a likely miscarriage of justice is
generally a euphemistic way of asking whether the prisoner can
demonstrate actual innocence.207 At least as defined in related but
distinct fields of habeas adjudication, the phrase miscarriage of
justice has emerged as synonymous with innocence.208 
States, 183 F. App’x 571, 578 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[Habeas motions are] not intended to be
substitutes for direct appeals or as a means of appealing the same issues a second time. As
a general rule, they are to be used only for raising alleged errors of law that are jurisdictional
or constitutional in nature or that amount to a fundamental defect that results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.”); Boettcher v. Doyle, 105 F. App’x 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[H]abeas
corpus review is available to remedy violations of federal law if the asserted error is a
fundamental defect resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. See MEANS, supra note 138, § 6:2, at 161-70 (cataloguing cases in which attempts to
obtain federal habeas relief for a statutory or treaty violation were unavailing); see also Davis,
417 U.S. at 346; Pethtel v. Ballard, 617 F.3d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 2010) (“It is a fundamental
principle of habeas review that not every asserted error of law can be raised on a [§ 2254]
motion. Instead, habeas review is available to check violations of federal laws when the error
qualifies as a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice
[or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting Reed, 512 U.S. at 348).
207. In case after case, the Court uses the phrase miscarriage of justice exception to mean
“actual innocence exception.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013)
(recognizing the equivalence between a miscarriage of justice and innocence exception to
various procedural rules); see also Berkowitz, supra note 7, at 501-02 (“Miscarriages of justice,
the Court intones in a literal citation of Friendly’s recommendation, are only present when
the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, there are lower court decisions
that conclude that fundamental misapplications of the federal sentencing statutes—for
example, misconstruing the statute so as to treat one as a career offender—may amount to
a miscarriage of justice. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). But this
appears to be a relatively rare occurrence and not one that has been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court. Cf. Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 711 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Melloy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the narrow definition of miscarriage of justice applied by
the majority in this context).
208. Some leading scholars take a more sanguine view of non-constitutional habeas.
Professors Liebman and Hertz, for example, have optimistically characterized the law as
permitting habeas relief for the violation of “important, but not other, federal statutory
claims.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 46, § 9.1, at 528. The case law is sufficiently sparse
that this question might fairly be deemed open. And to be sure, if indeed Reed only stands for
the proposition that the “formalities and minutiae” of trial procedure do not provide a basis
for habeas relief, then innocence does indeed remain irrelevant in this limited pocket of
habeas corpus review. Id. (identifying factors that might be used to distinguish between a
technical and nontechnical statutory violation without identifying any Supreme Court
decisions granting relief under this broadly conceived framework for non-constitutional
habeas); see also Phillips v. Holinka, No. 10-cv-439-bbc, 2012 WL 1516605, at *3 (W.D. Wis.
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Simply put, obtaining habeas relief based on the violation of a
federal statute has been substantially limited, and innocence seems
to be a key indicator of relief eligibility under this framework.209
Indeed, the only case in which the Supreme Court has recognized
the possibility of overturning a conviction210 on habeas through a
non-constitutional error involved a federal statute that seemed to
render the defendant’s past conduct noncriminal. In that case,
again, the focus was on those procedures and rights directly
associated with one’s guilt.211 
Apr. 26, 2012) (“[P]etitioner has shown that because reckless endangerment is not a ‘crime
of violence’ within the meaning of § 4B1.1, he should not have been sentenced as a career
offender. Accordingly, I am granting petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
vacating his sentence for resentencing without the career offender enhancement.”); United
States v. Meadows, No. CIV. A. 97-2798, 1997 WL 835413, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1997)
(“[T]he Government concedes and we agree that, pursuant to our power under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) and Guideline § 1B1.10(a), we should apply Amendment 505’s retroactive reduction
of Meadows’s base offense level under § 2D1.1(a) to 38.”).
209. The Supreme Court reversed a federal court of appeals and suggested that a
miscarriage of justice may have occurred when a change in the law rendered the defendant’s
actions not criminal. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47 (“If this contention is well taken, then Davis’
conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. There can be
no room for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice and presents exceptional circumstances’ that justify collateral relief.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Barrios v. United States, Nos. 3:07-CV-130-RLY-WGH, EV
02-CR-02-05-Y/H, 2012 WL 4470267, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2012) (“One of [petitioner’s]
convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized punishment for a separate
offense and must be vacated.”); Scott v. United States, Nos. 90CR.45(MGC),
97CIV.1633(MCG), 2000 WL 1051873, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2000) (“Sentencing petitioner
based on conduct for which he bears no legal responsibility is manifestly unjust. Therefore,
petitioner’s sentence should be vacated and reduced.”); Cooper v. United States, 639 F. Supp.
176, 179 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (“Because the Dowling decision held that the National Stolen
Property Act did not cover the activity that petitioners were charged with engaging in, this
Court lacked jurisdiction to convict petitioners under that statute.”). But see Ewell v. Scribner
490 F. App’x 891, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a violation by the State of a federal
wiretap statute was not a miscarriage of justice or violation of fundamental fairness so as to
justify federal habeas relief).
210. The Supreme Court has considered habeas challenges relating to one’s sentence based
on the misapplication of a federal statute. For example, in Reno v. Koray, the Court
considered but denied habeas relief when a prisoner argued that certain pretrial release time
should count as time served for his prison term. 515 U.S. 50 (1995). 
211. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346. Illustrative of the lower court case law on this question is
Llamas-Almaguer v. Wainwright 666 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1982). The court did not categorically
preclude the prospect of habeas relief under Title III, but denied relief in the case at issue
because there was “no reason to believe that appellant was not convicted on the basis of
probative and reliable evidence.” Id. at 194.
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In short, an array of procedural rules have developed that under-
mine the prospects for habeas relief in cases in which the evidence
of guilt is strong.212 In many cases, with an array of issues—from
whether factual development is permitted, to whether the prisoner
can benefit from a new rule, to what types of constitutional claims
can be brought, and so on—the threshold and generally dispositive
question is whether the defendant is guilty.213
3. Distorting Doctrine to Prioritize Guilt
The discussion up to this point has focused on the fact that
substantive doctrine and procedural law tend to prioritize questions
of guilt. If a defendant is clearly guilty, or at least cannot make a
plausible claim of innocence, the law rarely provides a federal
habeas remedy. Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that
the innocence saturation of modern habeas doctrine may have a
spillover effect. The persistent focus on guilt as disqualifying for
relief under established doctrine may condition courts to apply a
guilt-centered focus in ways that existing doctrine does not contem-
plate. It is reasonable to believe that evidence of guilt plays an
important role in shaping habeas outcomes even when it is not
explicitly contemplated by current doctrine. 
Cognitive science and common sense tell us that the general
doctrinal fixation on guilt likely shapes the way that judges
approach habeas issues that do not necessarily require the same
focus on guilt.214 Doctrines that do not consider guilt may begin to
212. Commenting on these procedural devices, it has been observed that: “such rules do
nothing more or less than direct judges to make fact-centered, case-specific judgments, usually
about the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt or of the ugliness of the
crime for purposes of sentencing enhancement.” Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 414. 
213. Cf. id. at 407 (“Lately, courts have begun to develop similar rules with regard to an
indigent defendant’s entitlement to state funds for expert witnesses, investigative services,
and other defense resources under Ake v. Oklahoma.”).
214. In this regard, the social science literature on priming may be a useful reference. See 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Terry L. Turnipseed, The Polling Place Priming (PPP) Effect: Is
Voting in Churches (or Anywhere Else) Unconstitutional?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (2011)
(“A substantial social science literature has demonstrated the power of situational cues on
behavior, decisions, choices, attitudes, and emotions.”); Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of
Priming and Perception on Social Behavior and Goal Pursuit, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS 51 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007); E. Tory Higgins, Knowledge Activation:
Accessibility, Applicability, and Salience, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 133, 133-34 (E. Tory Higgins
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do so at the margins, and doctrines that already consider guilt may
bend further in that direction. As Anthony Amsterdam has put it:
Judges parse the rules defining a defendant’s constitutional
rights more or less closely, more or less strictly, and more or less
honestly, in order to grant or deny relief, depending upon
whether they do or do not believe that the defendant suffered
some outrageous injustice that is way out of proportion to the
probability that he or she [is guilty].215
And even if this is slightly hyperbolic, it seems reasonable to worry
that the guilt fixation of modern habeas is not neatly cabined into
certain corners.
To be sure, reported decisions are unlikely to explicitly confirm
the distortion of doctrine along these lines. However, notable
exceptions exist. A Sixth Circuit decision, Apanovitch v. Houk, is
illustrative.216 Apanovitch’s habeas litigation led to the discovery of
several pieces of exculpatory evidence that had been suppressed by
the trial prosecutors.217 The question for the federal court, then, was
whether Apanovitch was prejudiced by the nondisclosures so as to
justify relief.218 That is to say, was it possible that the trial outcome
was tainted by the misconduct of the prosecutors? However, instead
of answering this question directly, the federal court of appeals
sanctioned a further investigation for more evidence of guilt.219
Specifically, rather than merely remanding the case to the district
court to assess all of the evidence presented at trial and weigh it
against the suppressed material, the Sixth Circuit advised the
& Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) (defining priming as changing one’s reaction to a condition
by exposure to prior conditions or information). If judges are primed to think about guilt in
the context of habeas through the variety of procedural and substantive doctrines discussed
above, they will keep thinking about it and in some instances act on it regardless of whether
it is actually relevant to the specific situation. See id. at 563-64 (summarizing research
showing the impact of priming, even when it is merely subliminal); id. at 564 (explaining that
when younger people were subliminally primed with stereotypes of the elderly, they
themselves walked more slowly and cautiously); id. at 565 (concluding that the data
unequivocally “demonstrate[s] the powerful influence of an individual’s surroundings on his
or her perceptions, thoughts, attitudes, and emotions”).
215. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 405.
216. 466 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 470-71.
218. Id. at 489.
219. Id. at 489-90.
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district court that it should “authorize a DNA test comparing swabs
of bodily fluid that had been collected from the victim’s body” a
decade and a half earlier to the DNA of Apanovitch.220 
Such reasoning is a bold extension of the Brady doctrine. The
already guilt-centered Brady doctrine is conceived of in even more
stark terms: if there is evidence of guilt, even evidence not yet
tested or discovered, much less introduced at trial, it can be
assessed and introduced on habeas for the first time as a basis for
denying relief.
The district court on remand followed the lead of the federal
appellate court and issued an order allowing the State to conduct a
new set of DNA tests in order to determine conclusively whether
Apanovitch was guilty:
In the present case, the Court finds that the DNA test re-
sults—if a match resulted between DNA found on the victim and
Apanovitch’s DNA—would show that even if Brady violations
occurred, under the totality of the circumstances he has not
shown that his trial was fundamentally unfair. The DNA test
results would have the effect of making the Brady claims
factually false resulting in a windfall to which Apanovitch is not
entitled.221
Stated more starkly, a federal prisoner’s habeas relief was
conditioned upon him submitting to a DNA test and a finding based
on that test that he was not guilty. The prosecution was permitted
to put on new evidence—evidence that was unavailable or avoided
at trial—in order to show that the prisoner was guilty and, there-
fore, undeserving of Brady relief. Prejudice for Brady purposes has
an intrinsic connection to innocence, but never before has the
doctrine countenanced that the prosecution can put on new evidence
of guilt on habeas review in order to preclude relief.222 The prejudice
220. Id. at 463. The fault for failure to test the evidence before trial apparently rested
solely with the State. Id. at 470 (“Meanwhile, the state filed a supplemental return of writ in
the summer of 1992 in which it explained that swabs of bodily fluids found in the victim’s
body, long thought destroyed inadvertently, had been found in a desk of an employee of the
coroner’s office who handled the Apanovitch case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Apanovitch v. Houk, No. 1:91CV2221, 2009 WL 3378250, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14,
2009).
222. One can imagine under this reasoning that the prosecution could hold certain eye
witnesses that may not present well to a jury and reserve them as “new” evidence of guilt that
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prong’s association with guilt led multiple federal judges to conclude
that additional investigation and testing to prove guilt, even
without a jury, was permissible as a rationale for denying federal
habeas review. 
If Brady claims open the door to a supplemental guilt trial on
habeas—at least when DNA testing is available—then so must
Strickland claims and arguably every claim for which harmless
error applies. Other courts are likely to follow suit and explicitly
permit new evidence of guilt untested by a jury to be a dispositive
basis for denying federal habeas relief.223 Most of this sort of
maneuvering is likely to take place behind the scenes, far removed
from a published order. But as the focus shifts from procedures and
constitutional rules toward pure questions of guilt, the very nature
of habeas review is altered.224 Guilt becomes dispositive. Or to use
one of our most lauded American metaphors, “[T]he blindfold that
Justice is supposed to wear as she weighs competing rights and
obligations with indifference to the outcome” is increasingly called
into question.225 In modern habeas, innocence is not irrelevant;
increasingly the only question that matters is whether the evidence
of “guilt [is] potent.”226 
could be considered as a basis for precluding habeas relief. The prosecution, by establishing
“guilt” without a jury determination, is able to avoid an otherwise obvious entitlement to
habeas relief with new, untested evidence. Cf. Apanovitch, 466 F.3d at 489-90 (“We suspect
that the DNA evidence, should it be introduced and subjected to appropriate evidentiary
challenges in court, might help resolve lingering questions of whether Apanovitch suffered
actual prejudice.”). It is worth considering whether such a practice might eventually be barred
by Sixth Amendment jury right considerations. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
482-84 (2000) (holding that the judge’s role in sentencing is constrained by the facts alleged
in the indictment and found by the jury).
223. In re Wright, 298 F. App’x 342, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2008) (permitting evidence of guilt to
be added to the habeas record as part of the prejudice inquiry). 
224. If evidence of guilt may be introduced for the first time in habeas proceedings, then
it would seem that new evidence of innocence—for example, DNA testing—should be
permitted for the first time on habeas as well. Stated differently, the courts ought to recognize
an exception to the extremely limited factual development permitted on habeas. See Cullen
v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 (2011) (explaining that DNA evidence might show
innocence sufficient to overcome a procedural default).
225. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 405.
226. Id. at 406 & n.3 (compiling cases on this topic). There is much more that can and
should be said about judicial hostility to habeas relief. The literature would benefit from a
careful consideration, post-AEDPA, of, among other things, the impact of an increasingly
conservative judiciary on habeas, the impact of ever increasing dockets on the time spent on
habeas cases, and the frequency of relief. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s seeming readiness
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III. PROSPECTS FOR A NON-INNOCENCE ORIENTATION: THE “FULL
AND FAIR” COUNTER-REVOLUTION
The above discussion has emphasized that Friendly’s call for a
greater focus on the innocence of the defendant gained substantial
prominence in the decades following the publication of his article.227
Simply put, Friendly’s proposal has aged well such that the guilt of
a prisoner has become a de jure or de facto reason for denying
habeas relief in more than nine out of ten noncapital cases.228 But
if innocence has regained (or retained) center stage, the proposal
that is probably its chief intellectual rival must also be acknowl-
edged, and that is the focus of this Part.
There is an emerging scholarly field recognizing a set of process-
based protections that are divorced from innocence and even the
merits of the underlying claims. Of course, it must be acknowledged
that prior habeas scholarship also advocated for a process-based
orientation. For example, Paul Bator and Judge Friendly, among
others, while critiquing the Warren Court, took as a given the
requirement of fair state procedures.229 In one sense, then, the
to depart from its own standard for certiorari review in order to engage in error correction is
worth attention. See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 1077 (U.S. 2012).
227. One of the most prominent works of habeas scholarship in recent years uses empirical
data in support of an embrace of Friendly’s model, or perhaps something even more extreme
than Friendly’s vision. Hoffmann & King, supra note 21, at 817 & n.94. King and Hoffmann
do not seem to permit an exception to the habeas limits in individual cases even when the
state process in that case was not full and fair. See Marceau, supra note 118, at 139-40
(describing the fact that in many ways the King and Hoffmann proposal is more limiting to
prisoners than the model offered by Bator and Friendly because it has all of the substantive
limits, but none of the procedural safeguards).
228. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 605 (“[I]t is clear that the probability that
a habeas petitioner in fact committed the crime is not merely relevant, but often dispositive
as a basis for denying relief.”); see Garrett, supra note 59, at 1692 (noting the “decades-long
campaign to restrict habeas review emphasizing guilt-based restrictions on habeas relief”);
Hans Sherrer, AEDPA Has Reduced Federal Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 39 JUSTICE
DENIED 17, 17 (2008). Whereas Friendly was bothered by the prospect of guilty defendants
getting relief, King and Hoffmann start from the opposite premise. See Hoffmann & King,
supra note 21, at 817. King and Hoffman emphasize that because habeas relief is almost
never granted, it ought to be eliminated for everyone other than those who can demonstrate
innocence. KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 125, at 67 (referring to federal habeas as a “costly
charade”).
229. See Bator, supra note 10, at 441-42; Friendly, supra note 4, at 152-53.
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modern scholarly calls for procedural habeas have a sort of back-to-
the-future quality. That is to say, they reflect a robust and appropri-
ate return to a structural view of habeas advanced by more
conservative scholars of a previous generation.230 In this view,
habeas proceduralism has come of age. In another sense, however,
it seems fair to regard the new generation of procedural habeas as
entirely unique because although Friendly and others assumed the
necessity of procedural adequacy, they wrote during an era when
complete, unfettered habeas was the expectation, and they were
advocating for the most limited model of habeas review that could
plausibly be advanced.231 
Either way, the scholarly proposals—both the current and
previous generation—reject the call to limit habeas to innocent
prisoners and instead suggest that, now more than ever, the
salience of federal habeas as a check on the fairness of the state
procedures must be emphasized.232 Such recent scholarship has
argued that federal habeas courts must ensure that, at the very
least, the state court process was full and fair.233 And increasingly
there is the tantalizing possibility that this full and fair the-
sis—insisting that habeas courts must ensure the fairness of the
state proceeding—is taking form in Supreme Court doctrine. In
particular, habeas proceduralism has seen life in a groundbreaking
set of recent cases—the Holland-Maples-Martinez trilogy. 
This next Section briefly examines the scholarly underpinnings
of the “full and fair” model for federal habeas, and then advances a
reading of the recent procedural trilogy from the Supreme Court
that suggests an alternative to the innocence model of federal
habeas review. If full-dress merits review of state adjudications is
a thing of the past, it is important to take seriously the role of
federal habeas corpus as a safeguard for fair procedures. 
230. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 81, at 1107; Marceau, supra note 42, at 7. 
231. In other words, it may not be fair to treat a modern habeas scholar’s view of the
necessity of fair procedure as conceptually the same as those made by Friendly and others
insofar as today proceduralism would be a step up for federal habeas, but fifty years ago it
would have reflected a massive diminution in the scope of federal habeas review. No doubt
this is why courts and scholars tend to link Friendly with an innocence, rather than a
procedural, orientation. 
232. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 83, at 128-29; Marceau, supra note 42, at 6; Marceau,
supra note 118, at 108; Primus, supra note 18, at 5.
233. Primus, supra note 18, at 5.
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A. Academic Projects Identifying Habeas as a Procedural
Safeguard
Scholars have recently paid increasing attention to the role that
federal habeas plays in overseeing the fairness of the state post-
conviction procedures.234 Rather than emphasizing the role of habe-
as in sorting out the guilt of the defendant, or even necessarily the
merits of the constitutional claim, scholars have recognized a role
for habeas courts in ensuring that the state court process is full and
fair. 
Eve Brensike Primus, for example, has reluctantly called for a
retooling of federal habeas review so as to focus more on state court
inadequacies of process.235 According to Primus, federal habeas
presently serves no deterrent function for state court judges because
“[s]tate judges know that, absent egregious errors, their decisions
are insulated from federal attack. Thus, when faced with crushing
caseloads, the lack of real federal review gives state judges an
incentive to cut corners, which has the effect of diluting federal
constitutional rights.”236 As a solution to this dilemma, Primus
proposes drastically curtailing current, individual-focused habeas
review and instead reinvesting limited federal resources in curing
“systemic” violations.237 
For Primus, then, the federal oversight should be focused
exclusively on instances in which the state system has fundamen-
tally broken down. The thrust of her scholarly efforts have been
directed toward envisioning the implementation of reforms that
would make such structural litigation viable, but Primus also
234. See, e.g., Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 476-77
(2013).
235. Primus, supra note 18, at 15-16. In an ideal world, it seems beyond question that
Primus would prefer full-dress, individual habeas review in each case. But in light of resource
constraints and the limits on federal habeas review she accepts as the next best thing a
limited, systemic form of review. Id.
236. Id. at 11. Interestingly, Primus believes that by reorienting federal review so as to
focus only on systemic violations of federal rights, the deterrent value of federal review would
increase. Id. at 12. Of course, under such a system, an individual judge would have absolutely
no fear of federal reversal for a claim grounded in a right for which there are not systemic
violations. See id. at 27 (“Given a world of limited resources, however, we must slice the
habeas pie somehow. For the reasons described above, I propose slicing based on the
prevalence of the constitutional violation at issue.”).
237. Id. at 16.
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recognizes that current habeas doctrine affords opportunities, often
underutilized, to challenge failures of state process. For example,
Primus points to the procedural default doctrine: 
Before the federal courts will procedurally default a habeas
petitioner’s claim for failure to comply with a state procedural
rule, the federal court will ask whether the state rule is an
adequate one—meaning, among other things, that it is consis-
tently applied in the state courts and does not unduly burden
the exercise of a federal constitutional right .... Thus, adequacy
review encourages federal courts, in some cases, to focus on state
practices that violate individual rights systematically.238
In a more recent article, Primus is even more explicit about the
role that the existing procedural default doctrine might play in
enforcing fair state postconviction procedures. Expounding on the
application of recent cases, Primus explains that “adequacy challen-
ges are often used to expose systemic failures in a state’s procedures
[and] [a]s a result, adequacy challenges have [great] potential to
catalyze change in states’ procedures.”239 Primus, then, is emblem-
atic of an emerging class of scholars who seek, first and foremost, to
use challenges to state procedures as a way of ensuring that federal
habeas review remains relevant. Her work brings deserved atten-
tion to the adequacy doctrine and calls for creative litigation in
order to ensure that state systems provide a fundamentally fair
postconviction system.240
238. Id. at 15; see also id. (“State actions that hinder compliance with a procedural rule or
make compliance impracticable establish cause to excuse a procedural default.”); id. at 28
(“Under the current exhaustion doctrine, habeas petitioners are not required to exhaust state
remedies if there is no available state corrective process or if the state process is ineffective
at protecting their rights. Systemic state violations are, by definition, circumstances under
which the state process is ineffective.”); id. at 28 n.159 (“[T]he adequacy of a state procedural
rule is a federal question that need not be initially raised in the state courts ... a petitioner’s
failure to comply with a procedural rule that he alleges creates a systemic procedural due
process problem in the state should not bar federal review.”) (citation omitted).
239. Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Council After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2607 (2013).
240. Id. at 2620 (“To be adequate, the underlying state procedural rule must be firmly
established and consistently followed, and it must not be applied in ways that unduly burden
the defendant’s exercise of her constitutional rights.”); id. at 2623-24 (“[T]he focus under
adequacy doctrine is on the state’s procedures. As a result, a federal court’s ruling on an
adequacy challenge often has broader implications for the offending state than an
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Other scholars have made similar, even more robust calls for a
process-oriented model of habeas review. For example, it has been
argued that “[a]s substantive challenges become increasingly
impotent, it is the duty of the federal courts, all the more, to ensure
that the state court process served as a minimally adequate
substitute for federal habeas review.”241 The focus of federal habeas,
then, is on ensuring that the state court process comports with due
process. For example, Professor Bator, even in the face of criticizing
what he perceived as an overly robust federal system of review
explained:
It is, after all, the essence of the responsibility of the states
under the due process clause to furnish a criminal defendant
with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate
his case: the state must provide a reasoned method of inquiry
into relevant questions of fact and law (including, of course, all
federal issues applicable to the case). If a state, then, fails in fact
to do so, the due process clause itself demands that its conclu-
sions of fact or law should not be respected.... Thus if a state fails
to give the defendant any opportunity at all to test federal
defenses relevant to his case, the need for a collateral jurisdic-
tion to afford this opportunity would seem to be plain, and
federal habeas is clearly an appropriate remedy: the state has
furnished no process, much less “due” process, for the vindica-
tion of an alleged federal right.242
I have expressed a similar sentiment when addressing the impact
of modern limits on habeas reform, noting, for example, that
individualized finding of cause in a particular litigant’s case.”). The one limiting feature of
Primus’s proposals is that they tend to focus on systemic violations, rather than unfair
procedures in any particular case. Often an inadequate process in a particular case will arise
because of some systemic shortcomings. Cf. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013)
(distinguishing unfair process in Martinez). But in some instances, a state court may fail a
particular prisoner in a unique way, and it would seem that such procedural lapses are also
deserving of federal attention. For example, presumably if ineffective assistance of counsel
claims ordinarily could be fairly litigated on direct appeal, but in a particular instance the
procedures were so unfair as to deprive the prisoner of such an opportunity, then federal
review is warranted. Of course, Primus might accept such a conclusion and note that in such
circumstances there ought to be “cause” to overcome an inadequately developed claim.
Primus, supra note 239, at 2607.
241. Marceau, supra note 118, at 136 (emphasis added).
242. Bator, supra note 10, at 456-57.
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“challenges to process rather than to pure result will play a critical
role in the next wave of habeas litigation.”243 It is possible to
conceive of various litigation strategies for habeas lawyers who are
interested in challenging the state postconviction process as lacking
procedures for full and fair review.244
Likewise, Professor Brandon Garrett has recently discussed the
unsettled relationship between due process and the Suspension
Clause and noted that, at the very least, “due process does help to
protect rights to adequate and effective access to courts at trial,
appeal, and postconviction.”245 Garrett’s thoughtful review of the
Guantanamo cases places particular emphasis on the notion that
the constitutionally “necessary scope of habeas review in part
depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings.”246 Garrett
recognizes a doctrinal and historical link between habeas and due
process and regards both as important checks against inadequate
procedures for developing facts and law relating to a prisoner’s
claims.247
Similarly, Professor Samuel Wiseman has observed that some
“guarantee of fairness” is likely to be constitutionally required by
the Suspension Clause and due process.248 Regarding the Suspen-
sion Clause, he notes that the Supreme Court’s recent Guantanamo
cases, at bottom, require a full and fair review of all constitutional
challenges to one’s custody.249 Likewise, Wiseman has argued that
243. Marceau, supra note 118, at 146.
244. Marceau, supra note 176, at 393-94 (recommending the use of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
as a possible vehicle for procedural challenges to state systems). 
245. Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 73
(2012); id. at 82 (“[T]he Suspension Clause has independent force: Even when the procedures
authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains applicable and
the writ relevant.” (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
246. Id. at 83 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781).
247. Notably, Garrett ultimately concludes that habeas corpus is not fundamentally
divorced from questions of innocence. He argues forcefully that after Boumediene there is a
necessary connection between accurate fact-finding or innocence and federal habeas review.
See id. at 123. I do not understand Garrett’s point to be in tension with my own; in fact I view
them as complimentary. Garrett sees the Suspension Clause jurisprudence as undermining
prior case law that questions whether there is a right to relief based on freestanding
innocence. See id. at 122. I argue that whether or not the Constitution provides for such a
claim, a habeas orientation toward fair procedures is required. 
248. Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 992-1006 (2012).
249. Id. at 996 (“There is ... a strong argument under Boumediene that AEDPA cannot
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due process must be understood as requiring a “federal remedy for
unfair state postconviction” procedures.250
In sum, there is a growing body of scholarship recognizing a role
for federal habeas that is distinct from a purely innocence-serving
function.251 Calls for federal oversight as to the fairness and
adequacy of the procedures for legal and factual development,
independent of the merits of the underlying claim, though histori-
cally underappreciated, are coming of age. As the recent procedural
trilogy, described immediately below, makes clear, the Court itself
seems to be moving away from its moorings in innocence and
towards more of a legal process, equity orientation. It seems
increasingly clear that an amorphous, evolving doctrine requires
that a prisoner must be given one opportunity for “a full and fair
review of his constitutional claims, either in state or federal
court.”252
B. The Procedural Trilogy: Holland-Maples-Martinez and the
Judicial Recognition of a Right to One Full and Fair Review of
All Claims
Consistent with the scholarly focus on fair and adequate proce-
dures designed to ensure that the proceedings below were full and
fair, decisions from the three most recent Supreme Court Terms
evince a decidedly proceduralist turn. Since 2010, the Supreme
Court has decided three cases—Holland v. Florida, Maples v.
Thomas, and Martinez v. Ryan253—the two most recent of which
constitutionally foreclose the consideration of new evidence in federal court when petitioners
have been denied a full and fair hearing at the state level.”). 
250. Id. at 1004.
251. Eric Freedman has championed this movement toward habeas-oriented fair
procedures both through his litigation and his scholarship. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 81,
at 1108. 
252. Marceau, supra note 42, at 7.
253. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313
(2012); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010). Martinez, which is surely the most
important of the three decisions, has been affirmed and extended in Trevino v. Thaler, which
further entrenches the salience of habeas proceduralism. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (2013).
Martinez explicitly relies on one of the leading habeas proceduralists, Eve Brensike Primus,
in declaring that federal courts have a duty to ensure basic fairness in the state court process.
132 S. Ct. at 1318 (citing Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 679, 689 & n.57 (2004)) (demonstrating that in many states the procedures
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stand among the most dramatic proprisoner habeas decisions in
several decades. The Holland-Maples-Martinez trilogy has already
been recognized by lower courts as a “remarkable ... development”
insofar as it reflects a potentially new direction for federal habeas
review.254 As one scholar has put it: “Together, these cases send a
strong signal that the Supreme Court takes seriously the need for
states to provide prisoners with adequate representation to raise
constitutional claims in state courts.”255 In light of these cases one
can fairly announce the beginning of a new era of federal habeas,
one that prioritizes protective proceduralism—that is, procedural
habeas litigation designed to ensure fair state court procedures.256 
1. Holland v. Florida
The first case of the trilogy, Holland v. Florida, raised the
question of whether and in what circumstances the AEDPA statute
of limitations could be equitably tolled.257 Albert Holland was
convicted for the murder of a policeman and sentenced to death.258
Following the completion of direct review, Florida appointed an
attorney, Bradley Collins, to represent Mr. Holland in all state post-
conviction proceedings.259 Mr. Collins then waited 316 days before
filing a petition for relief in the case, leaving just 12 days remaining
for raising ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review are inadequate); see also Thomas
M. Place, Closing Direct Appeal to Ineffectiveness Claims: The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania’s Denial of State Constitutional Rights, 22 WIDENER L.J. 687, 706-07 (2013) (arguing
for an exception to the rule that ineffective assistance cannot be litigated on direct appeal for
defendants who receive short sentences and will not be able to avail themselves of collateral
review); Thomas M. Place, Deferring Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral Review: Ensuring
Equal Access and a Right to Appoint Counsel, 98 KY. L.J. 301, 326 (2012). 
254. Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 55 (2012).
255. Primus, supra note 239, at 2617-18.
256. One could fairly ask whether this reading of recent cases is overly sanguine. It is fair
to ask, for example, whether these cases merely reflect an overdue reaction to the systemic
failures of certain state systems. Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUSTICE RUTH BADER
GINSBURG 71, 74 (2013) (on file with Harvard Law School Library), available at http://dash.
harvard.edu/handle/1/10582558?show=full. But the requirement of full and fair procedures
identified by scholars is not a requirement of ideal procedures; it is the minimum amount of
federal oversight required by due process. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976).
257. 130 S. Ct. at 2554.
258. Id. at 2555.
259. Id.
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under the one-year statute of limitations.260 By the time his post-
conviction case was on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the
relationship between Mr. Holland and Mr. Collins had deteriorated,
prompting Mr. Holland to write unsuccessfully multiple times to the
court and the bar requesting a new attorney.261 Mr. Holland also
wrote to the court clerk requesting information about the status of
his case and to Mr. Collins, specifically requesting that Mr. Collins
timely file a federal habeas petition if the state petition failed.262 
Unbeknownst to Mr. Holland, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed and finalized its decision on December 1, 2005, restarting
the then twelve-day clock for the AEDPA statute of limitations.263
Mr. Holland’s subsequent request for updates from Mr. Collins went
unanswered.264 Five weeks after the expiration, Mr. Holland
discovered on his own that the court had ruled against him and that
his deadline had passed.265 The next day Mr. Holland mailed a pro
se habeas petition to the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Florida.266 Mr. Collins never filed a habeas petition as Mr.
Holland requested.267 After Mr. Holland renewed his request to
dismiss Mr. Collins as his attorney, the district court granted the
motion and appointed Mr. Holland a new lawyer.268
The federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit both refused
to apply equitable tolling to the case, holding that attorney negli-
gence in a habeas proceeding is never an “extraordinary circum-
stance warranting equitable tolling,” absent “bad faith, dishonesty,
divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth.”269 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the AEDPA statute of
limitations was subject to equitable tolling and rejecting the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule that attorney negligence is never an
“extraordinary circumstance.”270 The Court reasoned that equitable
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2555-56.
262. Id. at 2556.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2557.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2559.
268. Id.
269. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
270. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2554.
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tolling should apply to AEDPA, rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s per
se rule in favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach and
emphasizing that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Holland’s
postconviction representation were “extraordinary.”271 
2. Maples v. Thomas
In Maples v. Thomas, the Supreme Court went one step further,
holding that although negligence by a prisoner’s postconviction
attorney is not cause for excusing a procedural default, abandon-
ment by a postconviction attorney may be.272
Cory Maples was sentenced to death in Alabama in 1997 for two
murders.273 Unlike almost all other states, Alabama “does not
guarantee representation to indigent capital defendants in post-
conviction proceedings,” but relies instead on volunteers.274 Two
New York lawyers, Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz of
Sullivan & Cromwell, represented Maples pro bono in his post-
conviction proceedings.275 Alabama required that out-of-state
lawyers associate with a local lawyer in order to proceed pro hac
vice.276 An Alabama lawyer, John Butler, agreed to be Maples’s local
counsel, but Butler made clear that he would serve no substantive
or active role in the case.277
Maples petitioned for Alabama postconviction relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.278 The trial court denied the
State’s motion for summary dismissal.279 While the petition was
pending, Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell for
new jobs that barred them from continuing to represent Maples;
neither told Maples or sought permission from the trial court to
271. Id. at 2562-64.
272. 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012). Carol Steiker has noted that Maples is illustrative of a
growing body of cases in which Justice Ginsburg has sought to bring attention to the systemic
defects surrounding many appointment of counsel issues. Steiker, supra note 256, at 73-75
(considering the relevance of the systemic defects in Alabama to the Maples decision). 
273. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 918.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 919.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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withdraw as required by Alabama law.280 During the following
months other lawyers from Sullivan & Cromwell had some involve-
ment with Maples’s case,281 but none sought to become attorneys of
record for Maples or to tell the court of Munanka’s and Ingen-
Housz’s departure.282 When the state trial court denied Maples’s
petition, the court clerk mailed notice to Munanka and Ingen-Housz
at Sullivan & Cromwell and to Butler.283 The letters to Munanka
and Ingen-Housz were returned unopened to the court by the
Sullivan & Cromwell mailroom; Butler got the letter but took no
action because he assumed the New York lawyers would appeal.284
Forty-two days later, Maples’s time to appeal expired.285 Maples
only found out when he received a letter directly from the Alabama
Attorney General’s office informing him that he had missed the
state appeal deadline.286
At Maples’s family’s urging, Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys
moved for effective relief from the procedural default, but the trial
court denied the motion.287 The appeals court and the Alabama
Supreme Court also denied relief, unwilling to excuse the failings of
Maples’s attorneys.288 Likewise, relying on the holding of Coleman
v. Thompson that ineffective postconviction counsel is not cause
sufficient to excuse procedural default,289 the district court and the
Eleventh Circuit denied Maples’s request for federal habeas
review.290
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding
Maples’s circumstances qualified as cause excusing procedural
default.291 The Court distinguished Coleman by explaining that
Maples’s case was not one of postconviction attorney negligence, but
was rather one of postconviction attorney abandonment.292 The
280. Id.
281. Id. at 925.
282. Id. at 919.
283. Id. at 919-20.
284. Id. at 920.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 921.
289. 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).
290. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 921 (citing Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 2009)).
291. Id. at 927.
292. Id. at 922-23.
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principle that a prisoner-principal “bears the risk of negligent
conduct on the part of his [attorney-]agent” in a postconviction
setting only applies as long as the attorney remains the prisoner’s
agent.293 Maples’s failure to appeal on time was uniquely excusable
because the listing of his absentee attorneys of record “meant that
he had no right personally to receive notice,” and no one informed
him until it was too late that he needed to act.294 
3. Martinez v. Ryan
The final case in the procedural habeas trilogy is Martinez v.
Ryan, which recognized an exception to the general rule that
attorney errors cannot serve as cause for overcoming a procedural
default.295 
Luis Martinez was convicted at trial of sexually abusing his
eleven-year-old stepdaughter.296 The prosecution’s case included
DNA evidence from the stepdaughter’s nightgown and expert
testimony explaining the stepdaughter’s recantations.297 Arizona
appointed Martinez a new attorney for appeal, but Arizona law
prevented the attorney from raising ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal, requiring instead the issue be raised in collateral
proceedings.298 While the direct appeal was pending, the same
attorney initiated postconviction proceedings but “later filed a
statement asserting she could find no colorable claims.”299 Marti-
nez’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and the Arizona
Supreme Court denied review.300
Martinez filed a second collateral proceeding with a new lawyer,
this time alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for, among
other things, failure to pursue an alternate explanation for the
DNA evidence or to counter the prosecution’s expert testimony
adequately.301 The court dismissed Martinez’s petition as without
293. Id. (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54).
294. Id. at 927.
295. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
296. Id. at 1313.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1314.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
2014] FEDERAL HABEAS AFTER MARTINEZ 2137
merit and as precluded by waiver for failing to raise the claims in
the first collateral proceeding.302 The appeals court affirmed on the
preclusion grounds, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied
review.303
On federal habeas review, Martinez again alleged ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, but the district court denied the petition,
explaining that collateral proceedings are not “first tier” review
protected by the constitutional right to counsel304 and that, under
Coleman and similar cases, ineffective assistance of collateral
counsel is not cause for procedural default.305 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the right to counsel never extends to collat-
eral proceedings306 and that Coleman foreclosed any argument that
collateral counsel’s ineffectiveness qualified as cause for default.307
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, establishing
an exception to Coleman: “Inadequate assistance of counsel at
initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at
trial.”308 Notably, the Martinez Court declined to take on the
constitutional issue, choosing instead to exercise its discretion to
elaborate “[t]he rules for when a prisoner may establish cause to
excuse a procedural default.”309 
C. The End of Innocence: Seeing the Scholarly Influence in
Modern Habeas
As noted above, the Martinez-trilogy suggests the beginning of a
new, less innocence-centered era of federal habeas review. There is
a sense that the four-decade-long fixation on guilt/innocence, spur-
red in part by Friendly, has run its course and a readjustment has
commenced. A fair reading of these cases, particularly in the
aggregate, triggers a very real possibility of judicial recognition that
302. Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
303. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
304. Id. at 1314-15.
305. Id. at 1315.
306. Martinez, 623 F.3d at 739-40.
307. Id. at 743 (citing Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
308. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
309. Id. at 1315, 1318.
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prisoners are entitled to one full and fair adjudication of their
constitutional claims.310 
Consider first the changes effected by the precedent in Holland
as well as the principles underlying the decision. Holland is the first
decisive break from a well-established line of cases recognizing that,
in the absence of a showing of innocence, the errors of a post-
conviction lawyer are attributed to the client himself. As a doctrinal
matter, few principles were more settled, or more reviled by the
defense bar.311 The Court summarized this agency approach to post-
conviction review in Coleman v. Thompson, in which a prisoner’s
execution was upheld despite the failures of his state postconviction
attorney to raise colorable constitutional claims: “Attorney igno-
rance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ [justifying federal habeas
review] because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting,
or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner
must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’ ”312 
As a conceptual matter, the break from Coleman was significant.
As a practical matter, however, the case has proven easy for prose-
cutors to distinguish, and commentators have lamented that
Holland did not go far enough toward abandoning agency principles
310. Marceau, supra note 42; Marceau, supra note 118. Habeas historians might fault me
for conflating competing models of federal habeas review insofar as both innocence and
process-oriented models of habeas could lead to the same results in some instances. For
example, some Justices might require certain procedures out of a sincere desire to avoid
punishing the innocent, while another Justice might do so out of a pure process rationale.
Ultimately, however, if the two rationales converge on a roughly similar result of requiring
one full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional challenges to one’s custody, then the
underlying motivation is of no concern. 
311. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (“[T]he petitioner must ‘bear the
risk of attorney error.’” (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986))); Ty Alper,
Toward a Right to Litigate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 848
(2013) (describing Martinez as having “upend[ed] what commentators and litigators had
assumed for years was settled law regarding the relevance of postconviction counsel’s
competence”); Adam Liptak, Lawyers Stumble, and Clients Take Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2013, at A12 (“The legal system generally answers by saying that lawyers are their clients’
agents.”).
312. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (emphasis added) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488 (1986)); see also Wendy Zorana Zupac, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating
Claims of Attorney Misconduct After Maples v. Thomas, 122 YALE L.J. 1328, 1343 (2013)
(“According to the relationship-based model espoused in Coleman, well-settled principles of
agency law require that the principal (the client) bear the risk of harm caused by the agent
(the lawyer) in the scope of the agent’s employment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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in the habeas context.313 First, the facts of the Holland case are so
extreme314 that it will prove difficult for subsequent prisoners to
marshal circumstances that are analogous to the “extraordinary
circumstances” required for equitable tolling.315 Stated differently,
even in granting Holland equitable tolling, the Court held that
“attorney negligence” alone does not give rise to equitable tolling,316
and proving that attorney errors crossed over from negligence to the
sort of egregiousness anticipated by Holland will prove unworkable
for most prisoners.317 Indeed, a review of all published and unpub-
lished federal decisions in the three years following Holland reveal
that of the more than 1900 cases in which a prisoner sought tolling,
federal courts granted equitable tolling in only eleven instances.318
In addition, the Supreme Court seemed to regard Holland as a
narrow carve out from the default practice, explaining its decision,
313. See, e.g., Marni von Wilpert, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner’s Last Chance, Attorney
Error, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s One-Year Statute of Limitations
Period for Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1463 (2010).
314. In Holland, the court-appointed attorney did not file a timely federal habeas corpus
petition, even though Petitioner Holland sent the attorney many letters stressing the
importance of doing so. Holland asked for the lawyer to be removed from the case. The
Eleventh Circuit held that Holland’s case did not qualify under the “extraordinary
circumstances” standard. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2559 (2010).
315. The reality is probably that ordinary negligence is so pervasive in some jurisdictions,
particularly as to missed deadlines, that any robust application of Holland might risk
swallowing the rule. 
316. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2568; see also Zupac, supra note 312, at 1353-54 (“[T]he Court
failed to articulate a clear theory for when attorney misconduct would be severe enough to
qualify as extraordinary circumstances, referring instead to ‘fundamental canons of
professional responsibility.’ ” (quoting Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564)).
317. von Wilpert, supra note 313, at 1465 (“While the Court stated definitively that
ordinary attorney negligence does not warrant equitable tolling, it did not actually articulate
a definable standard as to what types of attorney behavior would rise to the level of
extraordinary circumstances.”). 
318. The exception has proven largely costless for the federal courts. Less than one percent
of the prisoners who sought equitable tolling during the first two years of the rule’s existence
were deemed deserving. From 2010, when Holland was decided, through April of 2013, there
have been only eleven cases of equitable tolling out of nearly 2000 that sought such relief.
This proposition is supported by a survey of the cases citing to Westlaw’s Headnote eight of
Holland v. Florida. As of April 11, 2013, 102 federally reported cases cited to Westlaw’s
Headnote eight. Each of these cases were surveyed. The author also examined unreported
orders by using the following Boolean search: “order /5 grant! /10 equit! /2 toll!.” Although the
rate of habeas relief in noncapital cases has been shown to be similarly low under AEDPA,
one might expect that the number of prisoners who miss the filing deadline but have a good
excuse would be higher than the number of prisoners who can show that their state conviction
is constitutionally unsound. 
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in part, by noting that they were forgiving only a federal as opposed
to state rule violation. Accordingly, if only eleven cases are im-
pacted, and if the Court itself treated Holland as a minor deviation
from the agency/innocence model, then Holland stands as an
important decision of principle but not of practice.319 The decision
and its application leave substantially intact the principal-agent
model for understanding the attorney-client relationship in post-
conviction review.320 
In Maples the Court picked up where it had left off in Holland,
further chipping away at the dogma that, in the absence of a
showing of innocence, the errors of postconviction counsel must be
attributed to the prisoner.321 As in Holland, the violation of a rule
barring federal review was excused because of the errors of coun-
sel.322 But in Maples the Court excused the prisoner’s violation of a
state rule—as opposed to merely the federal statute of limitations.323
319. The eleven cases in which equitable tolling were permitted are: Ross v. Varano, 712
F.3d 784, 804 (3d Cir. 2013); Grecu v. Evans, 467 F. App’x 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2012); Dykes v.
Chappell, No. 3-11-CV-4454-SI, 2012 WL 3727263, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012); Stevens
v. Chappell, No. C 09-137 WHA, 2012 WL 3638547, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012); Chatman
v. Chappell, No. 3-7-CV-640-WHA, 2012 WL 2916358, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2012); Pollock
v. Martel, No. 4-5-CV-1870-SBA, 2012 WL 174821, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012); Williams
v. Birkett, 895 F. Supp. 2d 864, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Salcido v. Martel, No. 09-00586 MMC,
2011 WL 6181466, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011); Bolden v. Martel, No. 4-9-CV-2365-PJH,
2011 WL 6100509, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011); Stanley v. Martel, No. 3-7-CV-4727-EMC,
2011 WL 3154792, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2011); Doolin v. Cullen, No. 1:09-CV-01453-AWI-
P, 2010 WL 3943523, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010). Subsequent to the empirical study of
Holland’s impact discussed in footnote 318, at least three additional federal courts have
granted equitable tolling. See Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2013); Sanchez v. Gaetz,
No. 12 C 6717, 2013 WL 4836697 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2013) (holding that equitable tolling was
an alternative means to permit the defendant to file an untimely habeas petition); Randle v.
United States, 954 F. Supp. 2d 239 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
320. The Holland decision actually emphasizes the distinction between excusing the federal
AEDPA statute of limitations based on attorney errors and excusing a state procedural rule,
as in Coleman. Only the latter, explained the Court, implicates heightened federalism
concerns. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563; see also Zupac, supra note 312, at 1353 (“[T]he Court
distinguished Coleman as being a ‘case about federalism’ and the deference that federal courts
owe to a state court’s determination that its own procedural rules had been violated, while
Holland and the equitable-tolling analysis concerned federal courts’ ability to excuse a
petitioner’s failure to comply with federal procedural rules.”).
321. In addition to a showing of innocence (a miscarriage of justice), the Court recognized
additional, narrow circumstances when federal review was warranted. Maples v. Thomas, 132
S. Ct. 912, 922-24 (2012).
322. Id. at 927.
323. Zupac, supra note 312, at 1354.
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That is to say, the relief sought in Maples implicated federalism
concerns that were not at issue in Holland. Nonetheless, the Maples
majority held that on the unique facts of the case, as discussed
above, Maples had “shown ample cause ... to excuse the procedural
default.”324 
By all outward appearances, then, Maples was a groundbreaking
decision, allowing the errors of counsel to serve as a basis for
excusing a procedural default, even when the prisoner is not able to
make a colorable showing of innocence. The strict rule of attribution
of errors from counsel to client325 was excepted.326 But Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, emphasized the apparently narrow
reach of this exception by explaining that when postconviction
counsel merely “misses a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by
the oversight and cannot rely on it to establish cause.”327 More to the
point, the Court hewed to the principal-agent model, explaining that
only “when an attorney abandons his client without notice” is the
principal-agent relationship severed such that the acts or omissions
of an attorney who has abandoned the client cannot be attributed to
the client.328 Misconduct, no matter how egregious, is not a basis for
permitting federal review; in the absence of a showing of innocence,
a factual showing of attorney abandonment is required.329 Such a
showing, of course, will often be impossible to establish. 
The final and most important case in the trilogy is Martinez v.
Ryan. If Holland and Maples were at odds with a trend of ever-
constricting opportunities for federal review, then Martinez threat-
ened to fundamentally reshape the habeas paradigm. Rather than
requiring that a prisoner show complete abandonment, the Court
324. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 927.
325. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991).
326. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 914-15; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753.
327. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922. The circuit court in Maples reiterated the familiar principle
that “a federal court may still consider the [defaulted] claim if a state habeas petitioner can
show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879, 890 (11th Cir. 2009).
328. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 914-15; see also id. at 924 (“[U]nder agency principles, a client
cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him.”).
329. See id. at 922-23. Of relevance to the Maples Court was the fact that Maples’s former
lawyers had left the law firm and accepted jobs that barred them from continuing to represent
Maples. Id. at 924. The majority emphasized, however, that the decision did not “disturb
[Coleman’s] general rule.” Id. at 922. 
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recognized an exception to Coleman.330 Specifically, by satisfying the
Strickland standard, the once-impenetrable barrier of Coleman can
be overcome by a state prisoner.331 To be sure, the full scope of the
Martinez rule remains to be sorted out, and the rule may be
tempered by some important exceptions.332 Indeed the decision has
even been described as “unusually” narrow in its holding.333
However, for the dozens of prisoners who have been executed across
the United States because errors of postconviction counsel precluded
federal or state courts from reviewing the merits of their constitu-
tional claims,334 this decision holds out hope for a doctrinal shift that
may prove to be the difference between life and death in many
future cases.
There are two particularly significant aspects of the Martinez
decision. First, as noted above, it narrows the reach of Coleman, one
of the harshest and most widely applied doctrines for limiting
federal habeas review outside of the AEDPA. Just this notion
that—even in the absence of attorney abandonment—the errors of
counsel can be charged against the State so as to excuse a prisoner’s
errors is monumental. Second, and at least equally important,
Martinez has the effect of substantially curtailing the impact of two
of the most damaging applications of the AEDPA limits. Specifically,
Cullen v. Pinholster and Harrington v. Richter amount to a recent
one-two habeas punch that was insurmountable for most prisoners
prior to Martinez.335 
Richter emphasizes the deference owed to state court conclusions
of law by clarifying that the deference enshrined in § 2254(d)(1)
requires that federal relief be denied if it “is possible [that]
fairminded jurists could disagree” about the application of Supreme
Court precedent to the issue in question.336 
330. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
331. Id. at 1318; see also supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
332. See infra Part IV.
333. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1922 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
334. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991).
335. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770
(2011). In fairness, any number of recent habeas cases could be used here as a substitute for
my focus on Richter. Richter is simply one in a long line of cases that systematically narrow
the window for habeas relief available under § 2254(d)(1). 
336. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786; see also Marceau, supra note 118, at 108-16 (examining
the holding and impact of Richter). 
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Pinholster, by contrast, holds that even if one could otherwise
satisfy the daunting standard of review discussed in Richter, if a
petitioner needs to develop new facts in order to establish these
legal claims, he cannot do so. The factual record in federal court
cannot include facts that were not part of the state court adjudica-
tion.337 Martinez provides a plausible escape hatch from both of
these doctrines for deserving prisoners. 
Specifically, when, because of the errors of postconviction counsel,
a claim is not fully developed in state court proceedings,338 Martinez
permits the prisoner to: (a) overcome the procedural default; and
(b) avoid the strictures of § 2254(d) and, therefore, Richter and
Pinholster. By its plain text, the holding of Martinez recognizes that
defaults will be excused by a showing of ineffective assistance at an
initial-review collateral proceeding.339 Moreover, when a claim is
deemed defaulted, then by definition it is not “adjudicated on
the merits.”340 And an adjudication on the merits is a threshold
requirement for the application of § 2254(d),341 which in turn is the
triggering mechanism for the limits imposed by Pinholster and
Richter.342 Accordingly, if a prisoner overcomes a procedural default
by establishing a Martinez claim, then he is entitled to a federal
adjudication of his claim unconstrained by the factual and legal
record developed in state court. 
It is premature to assess whether lower courts will recognize and
accept this application of Martinez.343 But two early examples of
337. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
338. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012).
339. See id. at 1315.
340. See, e.g., Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401.
341. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). As the analysis above demonstrates, if a showing is
made under Martinez, then AEDPA’s deferential standards of review should not have any
application to the claim in question. This should be true whether the claim is not raised at all,
as in Martinez, or the claim is raised, but raised poorly such that the properly raised federal
claim is substantially based on different facts. Marceau, supra note 118, at 156-66 (arguing
that a state prisoner might be able to get around the strict standard of Pinholster by bringing
a new, unadjudicated claim regarding state process). The Supreme Court itself has recently
noted the importance of ascertaining with care whether a claim was in fact adjudicated on the
merits. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 
342. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780-81 (2011).
343. It is worth noting that arguments that a procedural default should be excused under
Martinez are no less strong if the failure to litigate a claim can be attributed to the state’s
failure to appoint counsel, as opposed to the ineffectiveness of counsel. See Trevino v. Thaler,
133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013); see also Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.
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lower courts’ application of Martinez provide room for limited
optimism. First, in Barnett v. Roper a federal district court granted
an evidentiary hearing on a claim that it previously had found to be
defaulted.344 Barnett had requested relief in state postconviction
proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty
phase of his capital trial, but the state court concluded that his
pleadings failed to follow a specific format and denied relief.345 The
federal district court, though finding that Barnett had “substan-
tially complied” with the applicable state rule, nonetheless found
the claim procedurally defaulted.346 In revisiting its decision through
a motion to alter its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e),347 the federal court held that the postconviction lawyer’s
failure to comply with the state procedural rules regarding pleading
requirements amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel so as to
give rise to the “cause” necessary to forgive the procedural default.348
Perhaps the most notable feature of the Barnett decision is the fact
that the state procedures that resulted in the default seem signifi-
cantly unfair. Specifically, Barnett was faulted for not complying
with a pleading rule. But the district court, even in holding that he
had defaulted under the rule, recognized that Barnett’s pleadings
“substantially complied with the procedural rule” and were actually
quite “detailed [and] thorough.”349 The distinction is striking. Prior
to Martinez the federal judge was willing to look the other way and
ignore state procedural traps, but after Martinez the very same
judge felt compelled to permit federal habeas review.350 Martinez
2013) (applying Martinez to a case where the prisoner was without counsel for post-conviction
litigation).
344. No. 4:03CV00614 ERW, 2013 WL 1721205, at *1-2, *17 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2013). 
345. Id. at *1 n.1, *5.
346. Barnett v. Roper, No 4:03CV00614 ERW, 2006 WL 2475036, at *24-27 (E.D. Mo. Aug.
24, 2006). 
347. Barnett, 2013 WL 1721205, at *2. 
348. Id. at *10, *13 n.20.
349. Id. at *11 n.17.
350. The district court’s analysis of the issue is revealing. The court seems to acknowledge
that the procedural rule’s application was petty and technical in a way that seemed unfair
such that postconviction counsel was not actually ineffective. See Barnett, 2006 WL 2475036,
at *26-27. However, in the wake of Martinez, the court explicitly recognized the need for
procedural fairness by acknowledging that either the state process was unfair (in which case
there was not adequate grounds for default), or the state process was fair (in which case
postconviction counsel was ineffective and provided cause for overcoming the default). See
Barnett, 2013 WL 1721205, at *11 n.17 (“It would seem inconsistent to this Court to allow its
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seems to be having an effect on the ability of prisoners to undermine
unfair state procedures. Guilt is increasingly not dispositive.
A second illustrative case, Dickens v. Ryan, is one of the first
federal circuit court decisions to consider the potential breadth of
Martinez.351 Dickens had raised on state postconviction a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to develop a
sufficiently strong mitigation case for the capital sentencing
hearing, and thus the claim appeared to be exhausted for purposes
of federal habeas review.352 In support of federal habeas relief on
this claim, however, Dickens offered “material additional eviden-
tiary support” for his Strickland claim—that were not merely
duplicative or corroborative of facts presented in state court.
Instead, the facts fundamentally altered the legal claim.353 Pre-
sented with materially new facts in support of a claim that was
raised in state court, the federal court had two options—bar the new
factual evidence from federal review under Pinholster and deny
relief or treat the claim as procedurally defaulted insofar as the
“new [material] evidence ... was not fairly presented to the state
courts.”354 
Although both options seem to result in a defeat for the prisoner,
the latter option—procedural default—actually provides an oppor-
tunity to the prisoner post-Martinez. Specifically, if a claim is
deemed defaulted when key facts are not presented in state court,
then the prisoner might be able to argue that the reason for the
default—the failure to develop facts—was ineffective assistance of
counsel under Martinez. If, per Martinez, the failure to appoint post-
conviction counsel is treated the same as ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel, then the failure to effectively litigate a claim
ought to be deemed functionally equivalent to failing entirely to
determination that Barnett’s claims should not have been procedurally defaulted, to enable
them to remain procedurally defaulted under Martinez.”).
351. 688 F.3d 1054, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit has agreed to rehear the
case en banc so the panel decision will be vacated. Dickens v. Ryan, 704 F.3d 816, 817 (9th
Cir. 2013). However, regardless of how the case is ultimately resolved, the fact pattern
illustrates the potential prominence of Martinez in future federal habeas litigation. 
352. Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1057.
353. Id. at 1070.
354. Id.
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raise a claim. Indeed, this is exactly what the three-judge panel held
in Dickens.355
The court held that the failure of the prisoner to present material
evidence in support of his claim to the state courts resulted in a
procedural bar.356 However, the court held that ineffective assis-
tance of postconviction counsel in failing to develop these facts in
state court may provide the cause and prejudice necessary to
overcome the procedural barrier. Stated more directly, the court
recognized that “the newly announced rule in Martinez may provide
a path for Dickens to establish cause for the procedural default of
his newly-enhanced claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing
counsel, if he can show that the claim is substantial and that his
PCR counsel was ineffective under Strickland.”357 In other words, by
enhancing an old claim with material new facts, the prisoner may
be able to sidestep the limitations announced in § 2254(d) and the
barrier to factual development articulated in Pinholster.358 
The Dickens application of Martinez is sufficiently important that
it is worth breaking it into four analytic steps: First, the proffer of
material new facts in federal court can result in a default because
the claim is fundamentally different than the claim presented in
state court.359 Second, a default can be overcome through a showing
of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel under Martinez.360
Third, if a claim is defaulted and then the default is overcome, the
355. Id. at 1072-73.
356. Id. at 1070. 
357. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added). This argument is substantially enhanced by the Trevino
decision. The essence of Trevino is an emphasis on meaningful, full and fair state processes.
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (emphasizing the import of a “meaningful
opportunity” to litigate a claim). If ineffective postconviction counsel deprived the prisoner of
a meaningful opportunity to litigate the claim, then federal review ought to be recognized as
appropriate. Id.
358. I have previously argued that by advancing substantially new facts, a claim may be
considered unadjudicated such that § 2254(d) does not apply. Marceau, supra note 118, at 160.
Specifically, I argued that “if the claim presented to the federal habeas court is materially
different than the claim presented to the state court, then § 2254(d) would not apply,” and
moreover, if that claim was not fully developed because of any inadequacies or unfairness in
the state process, I argued, there must be grounds to excuse the procedural default. Id. at 157-
58 (“Ordinarily, when a prisoner seeks to demonstrate cause and prejudice, he is pursuing an
entirely new claim that came to light after the state postconviction proceedings had already
concluded.”). 
359. See Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1070.
360. Id. at 1071.
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claim was not “adjudicated on the merits” under § 2254(d)(1).361
Fourth, a claim that was not adjudicated on the merits is reviewed
de novo, and new evidence is permitted to be considered by the
federal court.362
Dickens, then, differs from Barnett insofar as the claim—ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel—was actually presented to the state
courts in Dickens.363 In Barnett the claim was denied on procedural
grounds in state court,364 but in Dickens the claim—absent new facts
developed in federal court—was denied on the merits.365 Barnett
wanted his exact same claim to be adjudicated by a federal court,366
and Dickens wanted the federal court to characterize his claim as
sufficiently new such that a federal court would be permitted to
hear it.367 But there is no apparent reason to treat these two
situations differently. Both prisoners arrived in federal court unable
to litigate a substantial claim of constitutional injury because of the
errors of their postconviction counsel. It would seem incongruous to
treat those who failed to raise a claim at all better than those who
raised a claim in a defective, undeveloped, or unreasonable
manner.368 The “equitable” exception369 would seem to have equal
traction in either circumstance. 
Dickens and Barnett, as well other cases recognizing similar
applications of the Martinez rule,370 tend to substantially reinvigo-
rate federal habeas review toward a non-innocence orientation. Just
361. See id. at 1072-73.
362. See id. at 1072.
363. Id. at 1068.
364. Barnett v. Roper, No. 4:03CV00614 ERW, 2013 WL 1721205, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22,
2013).
365. Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1068.
366. Barnett, 2013 WL 1721205, at *1-2.
367. Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1068-69.
368. Justice Sotomayor, however, predicted that this is exactly the result of the Court’s
Pinholster decision. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1418-19 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
369. But see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319-20 (2012).
370. See, e.g., Schad v. Ryan, No. 07-99005, 2013 WL 791610, at *5 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013)
(concluding “that Schad’s new factual allegations set forth a new or different claim that was
procedurally defaulted and this is ‘substantial,’” and therefore a remand for a Martinez
inquiry is justified), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2548 (2013); Castillo v. Haws, No. 1:12-cv-00302-LJO-
BAM-HC, 2012 WL 5288813, *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct 23, 2012) (citing Dickens approvingly but
finding that the new facts did not, in that instance, materially alter the claim) (report and
recommendation), aff ’d, 2013 WL 856556 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013).
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as the AEDPA and Pinholster threatened the largest curtailment of
federal habeas oversight in decades,371 Martinez holds the promise
of restoring a sense of balance and equipoise to the field. Such an
application is consistent with the scholarly view that federal habeas
must, at the very least, ensure that the state court process is full
and fair.372 And such applications isolate innocence as substantially
irrelevant to the right of a prisoner to obtain meaningful federal
review.373 At this point, it is far too early to make definitive
predictions374 about the long-term application of the procedural
trilogy culminating in Martinez, but there is reason for optimism
that the cumulative effect is a “converging pressure” to recognize
the right of a prisoner to a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of his conviction.375 The remaining task is to
consider the most likely limits on the broad, proceduralist applica-
tion of Martinez. 
IV. READING THE TEA LEAVES: GAUGING THE IMPORT OF THE
MARTINEZ LINE OF CASES
In just the one year since it was decided, Martinez has been the
source of considerable hope for habeas petitioners and academics
who support, at the very least, a federal habeas review that
371. In Pinholster the majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent clashed over what
sort of circumstances present a “new claim” such that Pinholster does not apply. Compare
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 n.10 (2011), with id. at 1418-19 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). The robust application of Martinez in cases like Dickens substantially answers
this question—all material new facts can render an old claim new and thus defaulted. 
372. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 118, at 137.
373. The robust use of Dickens has not always proven successful. See, e.g., Foley v. White,
No. 6:00-552-DCR, 2013 WL 375185, at *7, *10-13, *15 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding that
the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not procedurally defaulted, and,
to the degree that they might have been, the underlying actions of his counsel did not rise to
the level of substantial, nor did they prejudice the appellant), amended by 2013 WL 990828
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 12, 2013).
374. Few would be better at predicting the decision’s long term impact than the writers on
the Habeas Blog. Their assessment is cautious, but forcefully concludes that cases like
Dickens have considerable grounding in Martinez. Jonathan Kirshbaum, Habeas
Corpus—Martinez vs. Pinholster—Who Wins?, HABEAS CORPUS BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013), http://
habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/2013/03/habeas-corpus-martinez-vs-
pinholster-who-wins.html. 
375. Freedman, supra note 42, at 592. 
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safeguards against unfair state procedures.376 Others, however, have
predicted that Martinez will make no material difference.377
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider some of the most salient
limitations that have been urged by courts and commentators.378
Most of these limitations can be derived from the rather caged
reasoning of the Martinez decision itself. As Chief Justice Roberts
has observed, “We were unusually explicit about the narrowness of
our decision.”379 
Specifically, three categories of limits could be derived from the
holding of Martinez itself: (1) the prisoner’s state court system only
permitted him to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim on postconviction review—it could not be done on direct
appeal;380 (2) the prisoner was completely denied counsel on post-
conviction review or his postconviction attorney’s performance rose
to the level of traditional ineffective assistance; and (3) the de-
faulted claim at issue was a colorable ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim.381 No one can convincingly argue that in the absence
of gross and prejudicial errors by postconviction counsel, Martinez
provides a gateway to relief. Accordingly, only the first and third
aspects of the holding present potentially novel and unexplored
limits on the application of this decision. Both of these limits are
discussed immediately below, along with the prospect of additional
376. See, e.g., Mary Dewey, Martinez v. Ryan: A Shift Toward Broadening Access to Federal
Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 269, 270 (2012); Freedman, supra note 42; Primus, supra
note 239, at 2606-07. Some early federal decisions recognize, if not a monumental shift, the
early signs of a broadening access to federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Gray v. Pearson, No. 12-5,
2013 WL 2451083, at *3-*4 (4th Cir. June 7, 2013) (“[B]ecause Gray’s counsel are barred from
fully identifying, investigating and presenting his potential Martinez claims, we vacate the
judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.”). 
377. Nancy King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2431
(2013).
378. Indeed, one of the most well recognized critics of federal habeas review, Kent
Scheidegger, provided his guidance on how best to limit Martinez within days of the decision.
Kent Scheidegger, Martinez is Narrow, For Now, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES (Mar. 20, 2012,
11:42 AM), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2012/03/martinez-is-narrow-for-
now.html. 
379. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1922-23 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(describing Martinez’s holding as having been “aggressively limiting”). 
380. The Court invented a new term to describe this aspect of its holding, “initial-review
collateral proceedings.” Id. at 1918. 
381. The Court held that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be “substantial”
and cited to precedent defining the Certificate of Appealability standard in order to define
substantial. See Freedman, supra note 42, at 593 & n.16. 
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significant limitations on Martinez, based on pre-existing habeas
rules. 
In short, this final Part provides a candid assessment of the
potential limitations of Martinez. Only by anticipating the proper
scope of the Martinez rule is it possible to realistically assess the
extent to which the full and fair model of habeas review is likely to
be a lasting doctrinal rival to the guilt-focused recent history of
federal habeas.382
A. The Possibility of Raising the Claim on Direct Appeal
The plain language of Martinez limits relief to those prisoners
who could not have raised the constitutional claim on direct appeal.
The Court emphasized that for Martinez “state collateral review
[was] the first place [he could] present a challenge to his
conviction.”383 The Court explained that if a claim cannot be raised
on direct appeal, “the collateral proceeding is in many ways the
equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assis-
tance claim.”384 The question for lower courts, then, was whether the
existence of a very slight opportunity—one that is for all intents and
purposes theoretical—to raise a claim on direct appeal completely
forecloses the prospect of relief under Martinez. Leading proponents
of limited federal habeas oversight argued that Martinez was
generally inapplicable outside of Arizona because most states do not
contain similarly explicit bans on raising ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal.385 Stated differently, the view was that
382. The focus here is on potential limits to Martinez not because Holland and Maples are
immune. Quite the contrary, Martinez stands as the culmination of these cases and to the
extent Martinez thrives or diminishes, the same would be expected of these narrower
procedural rules. 
383. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (announcing the possibility of an
exception that was later developed and adopted in Martinez). 
384. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (noting that ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel can serve as cause to overcome a procedural default). As Professor
Primus has noted, the Court was “clearly concerned about precluding federal review of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims when the state itself had created a procedural
system that effectively prevented defendants from having an opportunity to raise the claims
in state court.” Primus, supra note 239, at 2612. 
385. Arizona is not alone as a state that requires certain claims to be raised in the first
instance during state postconviction review. See, e.g., Gray v. Pearson, No. 12-5, 2013 WL
2451083, at *2 (4th Cir. June 7, 2013) (“Virginia requires prisoners to bring ineffective-
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Martinez must be read as limited to those jurisdictions in which
there is a de jure barrier to ever raising the claim in question on
direct review. 
In May 2013, just over a year after Martinez was decided, the
Supreme Court eschewed such a narrow reading of Martinez in
Trevino v. Thaler.386 In Trevino the Court held that even when there
is no explicit barrier to raising a claim on direct appeal, if it is not
likely, or if it is unreasonably difficult to litigate the claim on direct
appeal, then Martinez continues to apply.387 Trevino, then, marks an
unabashed reading of Martinez as endorsing the proceduralist vision
of habeas that requires, at the very least, a full and fair opportunity
to litigate each constitutional challenge to one’s sentence or
conviction.388 Of course, Trevino does not resolve the question of
whether Martinez applies to convictions from every state.389 In
Arizona ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be raised
until postconviction review,390 and in Texas the state courts had
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims, for the first time, in state collateral proceedings.”).
386. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1916-21 (2013).
387. Id. at 1921.
388. The habeas scholarship had previously explained that due process ought to be
understood as requiring a “meaningful opportunity to litigate the constitutionality of one’s
conviction.” Marceau, supra note 118, at 144 n.207 (emphasis added). In Trevino, the Court
rejected the Fifth Circuit’s limitation on Martinez because the Texas system did not “offer
most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present [their constitutional claim].” Trevino,
133 S. Ct. at 1921 (emphasis added). The impact of the full and fair procedural revolution in
habeas could be far-reaching. Indeed, although the scholarship and Supreme Court cases are
still in their infancy, federal courts are already applying the basic reasoning to produce some
astonishing results. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recognized an exception to the
longstanding and largely unquestioned rule that state prisoners may not challenge a prior
state conviction on federal habeas even if the prior conviction enhanced the current sentence
under review. Dubrin v. California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013). Citing the need for
full and fair state court review as a precondition to eliminating federal habeas oversight, the
Ninth Circuit held that a prior conviction could be challenged on federal habeas if there was
no full and fair opportunity to challenge that conviction in prior state or federal proceedings.
Id. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit recently held that when the same lawyer is appointed for
state postconviction litigation and federal habeas review, the opportunity to fully and fairly
present the federal court with a Martinez claim—that is, an assertion of cause based on the
failures of postconviction counsel—is unduly restricted. Gray, 2013 WL 2451083, at *3-4
(holding that new habeas counsel must be appointed to pursue ineffective assistance claims
against the state habeas lawyer).
389. Indeed, the Chief Justice has predicted that, instead, it will spawn “state-by-state
litigation” to work out Martinez’s application in every jurisdiction. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1923
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
390. Id. at 1914.
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recognized that it is “virtually impossible” to litigate ineffective
assistance on direct review.391 A number of other states are less
explicit. Professor Primus summarizes the process in several states:
The state does not forbid the claims on direct appeal, but it does
not provide any mechanism for expanding the record to substan-
tiate the claims. Without the ability to supplement the record,
most defendants are unable to raise the claims on direct appeal.
In these states with a de facto requirement, the courts strongly
encourage defendants to wait until postconviction proceedings
to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that require
additional development, and that tends to be the overwhelming
state practice.392
Based on Primus’s research, she has concluded that in the vast
majority of states, as a practical matter, it is impossible to fully and
fairly litigate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
review.393 Even when the record could be expanded on direct appeal
so as to develop such a claim, quite often the individual has
insufficient time to develop such a claim—typically less than thirty
days from the date of his conviction—and the individual is likely
still represented during this period by the trial attorney whose
ineffectiveness is at issue.394 Thus, although commentators are sure
to criticize the seemingly malleable “meaningful opportunity”
standard from Trevino, it seems clear that Trevino dictates that in
391. Id. at 1915. Professor Primus, who has meticulously studied the various state rules
regarding raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, has concluded that in many
states the prohibition on raising these claims on direct review is de facto, rather than strictly
de jure. Primus has summarized the state laws regarding these procedures by noting that in
“the majority of states ... defendants must wait until state postconviction proceedings to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Primus, supra note 239, at 2613.
Significantly, however, Primus concedes that even in the class of states that she characterizes
as prohibiting claims of ineffective assistance from being litigated on direct appeal, the
prohibition “is de facto rather than de jure.” Id. at 2614 n.39.
392. Primus, supra note 239, at 2614 n.39. 
393. Primus, supra note 253, at 689. Professor Primus has also observed that “[a]lthough
there are a handful of states that—like Arizona—explicitly require defendants to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state postconviction proceedings, most states’
procedures are not so clear.” Primus, supra note 239, at 2618.
394. Primus, supra note 239, at 2618-19. 
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a large number of states, Martinez applies so as to ensure proce-
dural fairness.395 
 Accordingly, although a number of states and commentators
concluded that Martinez does not apply beyond Arizona because
other states do not have the same absolute prohibition,396 such a
position is no longer tenable after Trevino. In Trevino, the Court
recognized that a hyper-formalist reading of Martinez is ill suited to
the purpose of the rule.397 It may be that some states provide (or will
provide) an opportunity to litigate ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct review that is full and fair as required by due process.398
However, in the absence of a realistic—as opposed to merely
theoretical—possibility of raising claims on direct appeal, the very
purpose of Martinez in ensuring that prisoners enjoy a full and fair
opportunity to raise their constitutional claims in state court is
undermined.399 Accordingly, in light of the Trevino gloss on Marti-
395. Out of Texas alone, the Supreme Court immediately remanded six capital sentences
for reconsideration in light of Trevino. Micheal Graczyk, Death Row Reviews: U.S. Supreme
Court Orders 6 Cases Reviewed, Including ‘Texas 7’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2013), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/03/death-row-reviews-supreme-court-orders-6-
cases_n_3379280.html.
396. Primus, supra note 239, at 2618 (“In Texas, for example, defendants are theoretically
permitted to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. There is no
explicit ban as there is in Arizona. As a practical matter, however, there is no realistic
mechanism for expanding the trial record on direct appeal such that ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims that require extrarecord development typically must be reserved for state
postconviction proceedings.”); id. at 2619 (noting that within just one year of the decision,
more than a half-dozen states had “convinced courts that they are not subject to Martinez’s
requirements because their state procedures do not facially require that all ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims be raised in postconviction proceedings”).
397. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (2013). Within weeks of the Martinez
decision the Fifth Circuit held that Martinez did not apply to Texas, which has a reputation
for being among the worst offenders of fair postconviction procedures. Trevino rejected this
conclusion, and the impact of the decision, then, is to emphasize that Martinez is serious in
recognizing the importance of postconviction counsel. See id. 
398. Marceau, supra note 42, at 36 (“[A] process that fails to provide a meaningful
opportunity to discover and produce evidence, fails to provide an opportunity to confront
witnesses where necessary, and fails to make relevant findings of fact will not be full and
fair.”).
399. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (noting that ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel can serve as cause to overcome a procedural default). As Professor
Primus has noted, the Court was “clearly concerned about precluding federal review of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims when the state itself had created a procedural
system that effectively prevented defendants from having an opportunity to raise the claims
in state court.” Primus, supra note 239, at 2612.
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nez, courts must take a clear-eyed look at the state procedures and
practices and assess whether, in a particular case, the prisoner had
one full and fair opportunity to realistically litigate his constitu-
tional claim.400 When the time is too short or the procedures
otherwise do not allow for a full and fair airing of a constitutional
claim on direct review, the ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel in failing to fully litigate the claim should suffice to invoke
the equitable protections of Martinez.401
In sum, Martinez has already proven itself sufficiently agile and
adaptable so as to overcome one of the most anticipated limitations
on its application. Trevino signals to lower courts a need to adhere
to the spirit of Martinez—safeguarding procedural fairness—and
suggests that formalistic limitations on the right to full and fair
review are not likely to be upheld.
B. Right to Trial Counsel as a Unique Protection for the Innocent
As noted above, in Martinez the Court addressed only the
question of whether a defaulted ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim could be overcome. The Court was not presented with
the question of whether other, non-record-based claims that are
generally or exclusively litigated through postconviction review are
similarly deserving of the Martinez rule. 
Particularly in light of the general reasoning of Trevino, it would
seem strange to conclude that for other claims, which like a claim
of inadequate representation at trial cannot be fully and fairly
litigated on direct appeal, the equitable considerations are less
400. Professor Primus has persuasively argued that states are stuck in something of a
procedural trap. They can either provide adequate procedures (including competent counsel)
to litigate the claims in state postconviction review or they must be willing to forego
arguments that the claims are defaulted. See Primus, supra note 239, at 2615-16. 
401. Justice Scalia predicted that Martinez would not be a costless right. The decision, he
predicted, “will impose considerable economic costs on the States.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It seems correct to assume that if states fail to provide competent
counsel capable of fully and fairly litigating claims that could not have been raised on direct
review, then Martinez allows for an equitable exception from procedural default. 
2014] FEDERAL HABEAS AFTER MARTINEZ 2155
compelling.402 Indeed, dissenting in Martinez, Justice Scalia
candidly quipped:
[N]o one really believes that the newly announced ‘equitable’
rule will remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
cases. There is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle
between those cases and many other cases in which initial state
habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be
raised.... The Court’s soothing assertion that its holding
“addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case,”
insults the reader’s intelligence.403
In spite of Justice Scalia’s confident protestations to the contrary,
some lower courts have endorsed a narrow, right-to-counsel-only
reading of Martinez. In Hodges v. Colson, for example, the Sixth
Circuit emphasized that Martinez holds only that ineffective post-
conviction counsel may “establish cause for a procedural default of
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial” and thus reasoned that no
other defaulted claims could be excused by ineffective postconviction
counsel.404 The court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court
“meant exactly what it wrote” and held that Martinez does not apply
to any claim other than a deprivation of the right to adequate trial
counsel.405 Specifically, the court held that not even a claim of
402. Wiseman, supra note 248, at 989 (“Although Martinez is narrowly focused on the right
to effective trial counsel, its holding is based, inter alia, on the fact that a ‘prisoner is in no
position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often
turns on evidence outside the trial record.’” (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317)).
403. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
404. Hodges v. Colson, 711 F.3d 589, 602 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1315). Nearly identical reasoning was applied by a divided Ninth Circuit panel. Hunton v.
Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that it was “plain that the [Martinez]
exception extended no further” than ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims).
405. Hodges, 711 F.3d at 603. In the wake of Trevino, it is largely untenable to accept that
the Court “meant exactly what” it said in Martinez. Indeed, the Chief Justice’s dissent is
largely a critique of the Court’s willingness to flexibly apply Martinez without regard to the
plain language of the holding. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1923-24 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). Moreover, it is worth noting that some passages in Martinez suggest that
the Court’s analytic inquiry was not quite so limited:
Coleman, however, did not present the occasion to apply this principle to deter-
mine whether attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qual-
ify as cause for a procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in Coleman
was on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding, and in that proceed-
ing the prisoner’s claims had been addressed by the state habeas trial court.
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inadequate assistance of appellate counsel, which cannot be raised
until postconviction review, could be excused under the Martinez
rule.406 Only a showing of innocence would suffice to overcome the
default, the court of appeals explained, because except as to claims
involving ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the holding of
Coleman v. Thompson “is still the law.”407
The result in cases like Hodges, while defensible based on the
plain text of the decision, is arguably at odds with the spirit of
Martinez insofar as Martinez reflects a procedural preoccupation
with ensuring a minimally full state process. Commentators have
rightly embraced Martinez as the last best hope for meaningful
federal habeas review.408 Moreover, it would seem largely untenable
to suggest, post-Trevino, that the Martinez decision must be read
narrowly and not applied beyond the strict language of the
decision.409
But the significance of this dispute should not be understated.
Lurking just below the surface of this very issue is the central
question presented in this Article: whether innocence or procedural
fairness enjoys primacy. If Martinez is to be read narrowly, why
would it be that the right to trial counsel should be read as uniquely
deserving of this special layer of procedural protection? The answer,
perhaps, could be that this procedure—an exceptional protection for
the trial counsel right alone410—reflects an innocence-preoccupied
notion of federal habeas review. Simply put, the right to trial
counsel enjoys a status as the protector of innocence and truth par
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316.
406. Hodges, 711 F.3d at 602.
407. Id. at 603.
408. See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 376, at 269; Freedman, supra note 42, at 1106.
409. The Ninth Circuit addressed the exact issue decided in Hodges—whether the Martinez
exception to procedural default applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel—and reached the opposite result. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that there is no reason to distinguish between ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel in this context). But see Ponis v. Hartley 534 F. App’x. 801, 805 (10th Cir.
2013) (“[T]he Court in Martinez made clear that it announced a ‘narrow exception’ that
applies only with respect to ‘cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial.’”).
410. In Trevino, the Court explained that the Martinez holding was based, in part, on a
recognition that the right to counsel “at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system ....
Indeed, the right to counsel is the foundation for our adversary system.” 133 S. Ct. at 1917
(quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317).
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excellence.411 Time after time in all sorts of different contexts the
Supreme Court has recognized the trial-counsel-right as uniquely
deserving of protection precisely because of the right’s perceived
affiliation with protecting the innocent. Indeed, the Court in Gideon
linked the right to counsel with the protection of the innocent,
explaining that without counsel “though [the accused] be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.”412 Certainly other rights, including the
Brady right are strongly linked to innocence,413 but time and again
in a variety of contexts the Court has recognized the counsel-right
as the protector of innocence par excellence.414
In short, it is possible that Martinez will be a limited exception to
the general procedural default rules such that only failures by post-
conviction counsel to adequately press claims relating to trial
counsel will suffice.415 The question is fundamentally one of just how
“narrow [the] exception” in Martinez will be.416 
411. Marceau, supra note 107, at 2484 (explaining that in some instances rights are
directly compared to the right to counsel and the effect is often that “the right in question is
deemed undeserving of vindication because, compared to Gideon, the other right is too
insubstantial and unrelated to innocence to warrant constitutional remediation”). At issue in
Martinez is the Strickland right, which perhaps has a slightly more tenuous connection to
protecting the innocent than the lodestar, Gideon itself. However, lower courts seemed to
agree that Strickland, like Gideon, applied retroactively. See, e.g., Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d
669, 672 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying Strickland to habeas petition filed in 1983); Wise v. Smith,
735 F.2d 735, 737 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying Strickland to habeas petition filed in 1979); United
States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 259 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Strickland to habeas petition
circa 1979). Of course, the explanation for this retroactive application might be simply that
Strickland itself was decided on habeas review. 
412. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932)).
413. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 591 (2002) (explaining that
the Brady right is predicated on a desire to protect the innocent from punishment); see also
Garrett, supra note 83, at 109-10 (describing Brady as an “innocence-related” claim).
414. See Marceau, supra note 107, at 2484.
415. Without conceding that Martinez is limited to postconviction efforts to vindicate the
Gideon right, Ty Alper has noted that Martinez is undoubtedly a critical case for allowing
defendants to “actualize Gideon’s guarantee.” Alper, supra note 311, at 841; id. at 846
(arguing that Martinez, though not a “broad right to postconviction counsel [represents] a
narrower yet critical right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in at least
one forum”).
416. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (describing the holding as a “narrow
exception” to Coleman). Presently, the lower courts are divided on this question. Indeed, there
is considerably less consensus about how Martinez applies then there was about the
2158 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
Looking to the impact of the right to counsel on other doctrines,
it has been observed that “[i]t is the abstract or idealized conception
of Gideon—its primacy, scope, and innocence-serving function—that
justifies limiting the vindication of other rights.”417 If this reasoning
is applied in the Martinez context, then the most promising
guarantee of a procedural fairness orientation in federal habeas will
have been passed over for a continued preoccupation with inno-
cence.418
C. The Limits of § 2254(e)(2) on Factual Development
In addition to the potential limitations on Martinez that can be
recognized from the plain text of the decision, discussed above, other
limits can be gleaned from an understanding of how the rule might
fit into the larger habeas context. One of the most significant such
limits is discussed in this Section. 
In Martinez, the Supreme Court only addressed the “equitable”
question of whether the ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel might serve as the basis for overcoming a procedural
default.419 The Court had no occasion to address some of the
peripherally relevant statutory provisions that govern federal
habeas review. Perhaps most important among the statutory rules
that threaten a conflict with Martinez is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2),
which governs the development of new facts in federal court.420 
seemingly opaque pre-Martinez doctrine. Compare Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th
Cir. 2013) (recognizing that Martinez applies not only to claims relating to innocence like the
right to effective trial counsel, but also to claims entirely divorced from innocence like
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), with Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2013) (adopting a rigidly narrow reading of Martinez as limited exclusively to claims of
ineffective trial counsel).
417. Marceau, supra note 107, at 2490.
418. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that treating Martinez as entirely disaggregated
from a myopic right-to-counsel focus will invite Martinez-styled arguments for a variety of
defaulted constitutional claims: for example, claims of prosecutorial nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence, prosecutorial nondisclosure of impeachment evidence, ineffective
assistance of direct appeal counsel, jury bias claims based on extrinsic evidence, and a variety
of other claims that state rules or procedures do not allow to be fully and fairly vindicated
through direct appeal. See MEANS, supra note 138, § 6:18, at 241 (“[D]irect appeals are
generally limited to the trial court record, whereas extrinsic evidence is commonly considered
in postconviction review proceedings.”).
419. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313.
420. By its plain terms § 2254(e)(2) only applies to limit evidentiary hearings, but it has
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The plain text of § 2254(e)(2) provides that “[i]f the applicant has
failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceed-
ings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim.”421
The question, then, is how this rule interacts with a situation like
that presented in Martinez where, because of ineffective assistance
of postconviction counsel, the defendant did not develop the factual
basis for the claim in state court. Is the failure of counsel fairly
attributable to the prisoner himself such that new facts may not be
introduced in federal court? On the one hand, pre-Martinez case law
defining “failed” for purposes of § 2254(e)(2) has stated that a
prisoner fails if the nondevelopment of facts is due to a “lack of
diligence or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or ...
prisoner’s counsel.”422 On the other hand, if § 2254(e)(2) is under-
stood as barring factual development because of the failures of
counsel in all cases, then Martinez will prove itself a substantially
hollow remedy—the very existence of “cause” under Martinez will
amount to a “failure” under § 2254(e)(2). One who establishes a
basis for the federal court to review the merits of the claim because
of the failures of counsel would, by the same proffer, demonstrate a
failure for purposes of § 2254(e)(2) that bars the factual develop-
ment necessary to litigate the claim.
To put this in perspective, there are four general types of cases in
which the application of § 2254(e)(2) might be of interest. 
First, it could happen that the prisoner’s attorney diligently
pursues a hearing or other opportunity to develop the facts in state
court and is unreasonably denied this opportunity. Just as before
Martinez, on these facts, the petitioner is not at fault for the
defective state court record, and thus § 2254(e)(2) does not bar a
been interpreted to impose similar limits on prisoners who simply attempt to expand the
paper record that may be reviewed by the federal court. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649,
652-53 (2004). 
421. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006). The statute provides for two extremely narrow excep-
tions: (1) a showing of innocence and a new rule of law made retroactive; or (2) a showing of
innocence and a new discovery of fact. Id. For a more complete discussion, see supra Part
II.B.2.d, discussing the impact of § 2254(e)(2). These exceptions demonstrate that § 2254(e)(2)
cannot be read as trumping Martinez because Martinez purports to find a new form of cause
and prejudice, but under the § 2254(e)(2) exceptions, a prisoner must always show innocence.
Notably, however, innocence was an exception to procedural default long before Martinez. See
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-32 (1985). 
422. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000) (emphasis added). 
2160 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
federal evidentiary hearing.423 That is to say, Martinez does not
change the inquiry in these circumstances. 
The second possible intersection of § 2254(e)(2) and Martinez
could arise if counsel requested an evidentiary hearing but did
not comply with every state procedure in advancing the request.
For example, perhaps the state courts require that a request for
a hearing be made in writing, or that such a request be accom-
panied by particular documents, or something altogether more
byzantine. Such rules exist in various jurisdictions, and a court
may hold that the failure to dutifully comply with every aspect of
such rules regarding requesting a hearing can constitute a “failure”
for purposes of § 2254(e)(2). In other words, the failure to com-
ply with procedural minutiae at the state court level may trigger
§ 2254(e)(2)’s harsh limitations. 
Although it is conceivable that Martinez might be limited such
that federal factual development is not permitted in these circum-
stances, there are principled reasons for doubting that this will be
so. First, the Martinez case is grounded in principles of equity—the
idea that it is unfair to hold a prisoner accountable for his post-
conviction lawyer’s failures—and it would be inequitable to conclude
that the failure of counsel to follow state procedures should be
suffered upon the client, just as Martinez holds that it is inequitable
to place blame on the client for his counsel’s complete failure to
raise a claim.424 Stated more directly, after Martinez, at least in
certain circumstances, it is inappropriate for errors of counsel in
failing to develop the claim in state court to be attributed to the
prisoner.425 Second, it would be odd in the extreme if a Martinez
error by counsel provided cause and prejudice to overcome a state
423. Id. at 432-36.
424. Martinez itself avoids creating a new constitutional rule. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1315. However, it is because of the availability of procedures for full and fair review, like
those provided under Martinez, that a direct constitutional question is avoided. Without a rule
permitting federal review in the face of a patently unfair state process, there is room for a
constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 248, at 996 (“There is, then, a strong
argument under Boumediene that AEDPA cannot constitutionally foreclose the consideration
of new evidence in federal court when petitioners have been denied a full and fair hearing at
the state level.”); see also Marceau, supra note 42, at 9-20. 
425. Freedman, supra note 42, at 596 (“[It is] axiomatic that ‘[e]quity looks upon that as
done that ought to have been done.’” (quoting 3 ROSCOE POUND JURISPRUDENCE 553 (1959)));
see also Zupac, supra note 312, at 1359-70 (noting the limits of the agency law analogy when
the postconviction lawyer is not acting in the best interest of the client). 
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rule that is, as a matter of federal law, deemed to be sufficiently
adequate and independent to deserve deference (procedural default),
but the same Martinez rule was insufficient to overcome a state
rule that need not be tested for adequacy or independence under
§ 2254(e)(2).426 Simply put, the sort of procedural rules that are at
issue when a state court denies an evidentiary hearing might not be
well established or regularly applied; indeed, a novel rule might be
applied for the first time427 or in a way that resembles a procedural
trap.428 Accordingly, if the violation of a rule that is adequate, as a
matter of federal law, can be overcome through a showing of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, then a fortiori such
a showing must suffice to overcome a violation of a state rule that
has not been tested for adequacy.429 
The third variation of the way in which Martinez and § 2254(e)(2)
could interact involves a postconviction lawyer who complies with
the various state procedures, is afforded adequate opportunity to
develop a claim, and simply fails to do so.430 At least where the
426. Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Note, Raising the Defense of Procedural Default Sua Sponte: Who
Will Enforce the Great Writ of Liberty?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 896-97 (2000) (“When
a federal court conducts direct appellate review of a state court judgment, the ‘independent
and adequate state ground’ doctrine, whether it applies to substantive or procedural state
grounds, is a jurisdictional matter. Therefore, the presence of an ‘independent and adequate
state ground’ is a matter of immediate consequence on direct review. Because state courts
must often address overlapping state and federal issues, federal courts on appeal may be
uncertain whether the previous state decision rested primarily on state or federal law.”).
427. See 2 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 3:92, at 585-86 (West 2003) (recognizing that in order to be ad-
equate grounds for a default the state rule must be “supported by prior state practice,” must not
be “[n]ovel”, must be “well established” and cannot be an “obvious subterfuge or arbitrary device”).
428. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375-88 (2002).
429. Another formulation of this same argument is to say that by satisfying the “cause”
standard required to overcome a default, a Martinez-petitioner necessarily satisfies the
diligence (non-failure) standard under § 2254(e)(2). The Supreme Court’s decisions provide
substantial authority for this position insofar as they have linked the “failed” standard under
§ 2254(e)(2) to the pre-AEDPA standard under which a failure to develop facts was excused.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 444 (2000) (equating the diligence required under
§ 2254(e)(2) with the traditional cause standard required in the procedural default context);
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1992). 
430. An analogy might be drawn between these facts, and the Court’s recognition that for
equitable purposes, the same concerns arise whether a prisoner is appointed ineffective
counsel or he is appointed no attorney at all. Martinez v. Ryan, 139 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012)
(“The same would be true if the State did not appoint an attorney to assist the prisoner in the
initial-review collateral proceeding. The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with
the State’s procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal
constitutional law.”).
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failure to develop the record ultimately leaves the claim untenable,
a failure to develop facts—leading to something tantamount to a
default—is the same as the failure to raise a claim: an actual
default. If the failure to raise a claim entirely is grounds for
excusing a default, then a lawyer’s failure to meaningfully develop
the same claim must also provide a basis for overcoming the
default.431 That is to say, when a claim is left in barebones form,
undeveloped and implausible, denying the necessary development
of the facts in support of that claim in federal court based on the
plain language of § 2254(e)(2) once again would make no sense.432 To
read § 2254(e)(2) as a limit on Martinez in cases in which the
prisoner does not raise, or factually develop, the claim is essentially
to hold that Martinez does not in the slightest displace the prior
Coleman precedent. If the procedural default is overcome through
Martinez only to have a factual roadblock under § 2254(e)(2),
Martinez has not changed the equities of postconviction litigation,
just the labeling as to why one loses.433 As Professor Freedman has
insightfully summarized the situation: “Martinez will do nothing to
help the federal habeas petitioner if the District Court considers his
431. Some of the Justices have already expressed this very point. See Gallow v. Cooper, 133
S. Ct. 2730, 2731 (2013) (Breyer, J., respecting denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (“I
recognize that no United States Court of Appeals has clearly adopted a position that might
give Gallow relief. But I stress that the denial of certiorari here is not a reflection of the
merits of Gallow’s claims.”). Justice Breyer explained that a claim in which postconviction
counsel failed to effectively litigate is no different than a claim that counsel failed to raise
altogether. Remarking on the former, he noted that:
A claim without any evidence to support it might as well be no claim at all. In
such circumstances, where state habeas counsel deficiently neglects to bring
forward “any admissible evidence” to support a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, there seems to me to be a strong argument that the
state habeas counsel’s ineffective assistance results in a procedural default of
that claim.
Id.
432. At least one federal court of appeals has concluded, however, that postconviction
counsel’s failure to develop facts in support of a claim might be distinguished from the
circumstances in which the underlying claim was entirely undeveloped. See Mann v. Moore,
No. 13-11322-P, slip op. at 11 (11th Cir. Apr. 9, 2013) (“This Court also harbors serious doubts
that Martinez applies to permit Mann to challenge the failure of his state collateral counsel
to present ... evidence when the underlying constitutional claim was not procedurally
defaulted.”). 
433. Instead of being denied federal review because of a procedural default, one would be
denied the opportunity to develop a claim under § 2254(e)(2). The result is just as inequitable
under either label. 
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underlying claim of trial court ineffectiveness on the very record
that he asserts was flawed by the ineffective assistance of state
post-conviction counsel.”434
The fourth, final, and potentially most potent threat to Martinez’s
robust application in this context arises in pro se state postconvic-
tion litigation. Although Martinez was appointed state postconvic-
tion counsel who could be faulted for the failure to raise a colorable
claim of constitutional injury, in many instances a noncapital
prisoner will not enjoy the assistance of counsel for postconviction
litigation. Because there is generally no right to counsel under state
or federal law for noncapital prisoners, perhaps the most common
interaction of Martinez and § 2254(e)(2) could be the noncapital, pro
se defendant who fails to properly raise a viable claim of constitu-
tional error. Such cases will present courts with a difficult choice.
On the one hand, Martinez is most directly and explicitly concerned
with the inequity of suffering upon a prisoner the errors and
omissions of an incompetent lawyer so as to deprive the prisoner of
any meaningful opportunity to litigate a constitutional claim. On
the other hand, if Martinez represents more broadly the realization
that federal review is required in the absence of a meaningful
opportunity to litigate federal constitutional claims in state court,
then states that refuse counsel to postconviction prisoners could be
opening the door to broader federal review.435 It is simply too
premature to make predictions about how courts will eventually
apply Martinez in the context of noncapital prisoners who are not
appointed postconviction counsel, but this certainly stands as the
most daunting challenge under § 2254(e)(2) to a robust application
of Martinez and, therefore, the proceduralist model of habeas
review. 
In short, one of the most debilitating limits on Martinez could be
a strict reading of § 2254(e)(2) such that even though the default is
forgiven, the impediment to factual development is not. Because the
inability to develop a factual record on habeas would prove fatal to
most such claims,436 reading § 2254(e)(2) as trumping Martinez
434. Freedman, supra note 42, at 596.
435. Cf. Primus, supra note 239, at 2620 (arguing that states must either provide adequate pro-
cedures, including competent counsel, or forego the benefits of the procedural default regime). 
436. Marceau, supra note 176, at 391 (explaining the importance of factual development
to federal habeas litigation). 
2164 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2071
would be a substantial death-knell to the full and fair model of
habeas adjudication.437 Particularly in light of Trevino, however,
such a reading of Martinez seems unlikely to prevail. The thrust of
the Court’s Martinez-trilogy is to emphasize the need for federal
courts to intervene when the state process fails to sufficiently
protect the federal constitutional right in question—that is, when
the state process is not full and fair. Trevino teaches that Martinez
is a rule of function rather than formality, and reading § 2254(e)(2)
as barring factual development for the very failures of process that
justify Martinez relief would be incongruous. If state courts must
abide by the rule that they provide minimally fair postconviction
procedures—a meaningful opportunity to challenge the constitution-
ality of their conviction—then § 2254(e)(2) must not serve as a
barrier to Martinez relief.
D. The Federal Statute of Limitations
An additional potential limitation on the availability of Martinez-
based relief is the federal statute of limitations.438 The statute of
limitations is designed to facilitate the goal of speedier federal
review and greater finality for state convictions by requiring that
any federal claims be raised, if at all, within one year of the state
conviction becoming final.439 There are at least a couple of ways in
which the viability of Martinez depends on the application of the
federal statute of limitations.
First, it is conceivable that the errors of post-conviction counsel
would be of such a nature as to deprive the prisoner of an opportu-
nity to timely file his federal petition. If, for example, the State rules
do not require that post-conviction petitions be filed within one year
of the conviction, then a post-conviction lawyer might file a petition
that is timely under state law but that will preclude the filing of a
timely federal habeas petition.440 In these circumstances the only
437. At least some courts appear to have recognized the need to avoid such a conundrum.
See, e.g., Collazo v. Curley, No. 11-6 Erie, 2012 WL 2026830, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. June 5, 2012).
438. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006).
439. See id. (permitting tolling for the time during which the prisoner pursues state
postconviction remedies). 
440. The federal statute of limitations is one year and is tolled only after a state post-
conviction is properly filed and pending in state court. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).
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reason for missing the federal deadline for filing was an error or
oversight of counsel. In such circumstances it is unclear whether the
heightened standards of equitable tolling441 would always permit the
federal filing, but it is arguable that Martinez ought to excuse the
missed deadline. Specifically, if the errors of post-conviction counsel
can serve as a basis for overcoming a default, then presumably
errors by counsel should also serve as a basis for tolling or excusing
the federal statute of limitations.
In addition, the federal statute of limitations may be implicated
when prisoners attempt to litigate claims based on new evidence
discovered during federal habeas review. As discussed above, in any
case in which habeas discovery leads to the development of new
evidence that materially alters the underlying claim,442 arguably
Martinez applies so as to permit the prisoner to overcome a
procedural default by pointing to the failures of postconviction
counsel to develop the claim. The claim is “new” in the sense that
there are materially different facts in support of the claim, and it is
sufficiently different from the exhausted claim so as to be considered
unadjudicated by the state courts. In this context, the Supreme
Court’s relation back doctrine may prove to be a barrier to Martinez
relief.
The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner can add claims to an
existing federal habeas petition after the running of the one-year
statute of limitations only if the claims relate back to one of the
timely filed claims.443 Specifically, the Court has explained that
amendments to habeas petitions are permitted only insofar as they
arise out of “the same core facts as the timely filed claim.”444
Obviously, a single claim generally cannot simultaneously arise out
of the same facts—so as to satisfy the statute of limitations—and be
based on materially different facts that fundamentally alter the
claim, so as to trigger Martinez’s exception to the procedural default
rules.445
441. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (recognizing the need for a flexible approach
that considers negligence by counsel, but does not treat it as determinative and noting that
simple errors in miscalculating deadlines will not suffice for equitable tolling).
442. See Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding a claim to be “new”
insofar as there was “material additional evidentiary support”).
443. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654-64 (2005).
444. Id. at 657.
445. Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a claim that
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A simple fact pattern will help illustrate the conundrum. Assume
that a state prisoner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel based on counsel’s failure to present compelling and
available mitigation evidence during a capital sentencing proceed-
ing. In state postconviction proceedings the claim is raised under
the Sixth Amendment but the factual support is limited to a few
conclusory allegations relating to the availability of the prisoner’s
mother to testify about the fact that he was bullied as a child. After
relief is denied in state court, a federal habeas petition is filed, in
which an ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing claim
is also raised. After filing the petition, federal habeas counsel seek
to expand the record and obtain an evidentiary hearing to develop
evidence showing considerable additional mitigating evidence such
as child abuse and brain disorders. The new evidence is typically not
permitted to be considered by the federal court.446 However, if the
prisoner can show that the new evidence materially alters the
underlying claim so as to effectively render it a new claim (for
example, a new claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing), then
the federal court can permit the new evidence.447 In such circum-
stances, Martinez may provide a basis for excusing the default of the
new claim, but if the new evidence emerged after the expiration of
the one-year statute of limitations, as is often the case, then it is
conceivable that relief could nonetheless be precluded.
Stated differently, unless new claims—or material new facts in
support of claims—are discovered prior to filing the initial federal
habeas petition, overcoming a default based on Martinez could be
substantially more difficult than originally anticipated because of
the statute of limitations. Neither commentators nor courts have yet
confronted this procedural conundrum. However, permitting such
a limit on Martinez would subvert the decision’s core promise of a
meaningful opportunity to litigate constitutional challenges to one’s
conviction. The opportunity need not be perfect and the prisoner
might not avail himself of the opportunity, but the proceduralist
promise, embodied in cases like Martinez, is that every prisoner
was cognizable because of the Martinez exception satisfied the relation back doctrine insofar
as the key facts underlying the claim relate back to factual (though not legal) allegations
contained in the initial, timely habeas petition).
446. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011).
447. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 118, at 157; Wiseman, supra note 248, at 968. 
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shall have a meaningful opportunity to litigate the federal constitu-
tional challenges to his conviction. When ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel deprived a prisoner of the opportunity for
such a review, the Court overturned prior precedent and carved out
an exception to a longstanding rule.448 Likewise, where the federal
statute of limitations threatens to act as the barrier to a full and fair
review of one’s claims—claims that were not meaningfully reviewed
in state court—the Court ought to recognize an exception. 
As a doctrinal matter, the most plausible way around the statute
of limitations problem that will arise in some Martinez litigation is
to recognize the interaction of Holland v. Florida and Martinez v.
Ryan. Operating in conjunction, Martinez would permit a prisoner
the opportunity to raise a new claim on federal habeas review based
on newly discovered facts when the reason the claim was not raised
below was ineffective assistance, and Holland could be read as
equitably tolling the statute of limitations so as to allow prisoners
to litigate in federal court claims that were not meaningfully
developed in state court litigation.449 Such a development would
represent only a modest shift in current habeas doctrine.450 And
more importantly, if a federal judge can overlook a prisoner’s
violation of an independent and adequate state rule when state
postconviction counsel is ineffective, then surely a federal rule that
lacks the same grounding in principles of comity and federalism
should recognize a similar exception.451 If Martinez opens the door
448. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
449. Many federal courts seem to treat Pinholster as a general bar on federal factual
development. But if fact development might uncover defaulted claims—for example,
unadjudicated claims for which habeas relief is available outside the confines of
Pinholster—then discovery should be permitted in many cases. More to the point, it must be
an abuse of discretion to reflexively deny funding to develop facts in support of defaulted
claims, even if such an approach was permissible pre-Martinez. Factual development in
federal court may be the only way that some defaulted claims will ever be discovered. Without
federal discovery there may never be a “meaningful opportunity” to litigate a number of
constitutional claims. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
450. It must be acknowledged that under the facts as described above the prisoner would
not be entitled to traditional equitable tolling because he would likely not be able to show
exceptional circumstances or diligence, but the equities would nonetheless balance in favor
of permitting tolling. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).
451. Interestingly, some federal courts have implicitly accepted this reasoning. For
example, in a recent case, the Fourth Circuit remanded a habeas case so as to give the
prisoner an opportunity to “fully identif[y], investigat[e], and present” potential Martinez
claims. Gray v. Pearson, No. 12-5, 2013 WL 2451083, at *4 (4th Cir. June 7, 2013). Obviously,
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to vindicating otherwise unavailable constitutional claims, the same
equitable concerns that undergird the rule ought to prevent the
federal statute of limitations from closing off such relief. 
Martinez signals a new, proceduralist era for habeas corpus
litigation, but there is a risk that one or more of the limits articu-
lated in this section could subvert the decision’s ability to have a
monumental impact. This is problematic because Martinez is a
necessary offset to the innocence focus of habeas review that has
become entrenched over the last several decades. If habeas corpus
law is going to embrace the call for greater attention to guilt, then
it must also insist on the importance of fair state procedures. 
Although writing at a very different time in habeas history, both
Bator and Friendly took for granted the requirement of full and fair
procedural review. Although both played a role in fostering the
guilt-centered systems that now exist, given the choice, they would
both probably prefer the procedural vision of habeas presented in
this Article to the habeas model of innocence without fair proce-
dures.452 Whether one accepts or rejects the guilt focus of modern
habeas, an insistence on full and fair state court procedures should
be viewed as essential, and Martinez has the potential to safeguard
such a proceduralist legacy. 
CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes once famously described the role of federal habeas
courts by explaining that “what we have to deal with is not the
petitioner’s innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their
constitutional rights have been preserved.”453 This notion that
rights, independent of a strong showing of innocence, justified
federal relief was famously called into question by Judge Friendly.
Friendly urged a system of federal habeas review in which inno-
cence was more central. Changes on the Court and the political
presenting such claims would require amending a habeas petition after the running of the
statute of limitations, but the court seemed to assume that such an amendment is
contemplated by the Martinez line of cases. See id. at *1-4.
452. See Marceau, supra note 118, at 137-38 (explaining that modern habeas is in the
“worst” of all worlds in that it neither permits full merits relitigation, nor does it require a
careful review of the fairness of state procedures).
453. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
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climate have afforded Friendly’s proposal a sacred spot in the
modern history of federal courts. Far from irrelevant, questions of
guilt and innocence have generally emerged as dispositive. Obvious
guilt is almost always a formal or informal barrier to federal habeas
relief. 
Recently, however, the Court has increasingly signaled its
approval for a full and fair, proceduralist orientation to federal
habeas. The Court has taken significant steps toward recognizing
that federal habeas plays a critical role in overseeing the fundamen-
tal fairness of state procedures. It remains to be seen exactly how
drastically the Martinez-trilogy will alter the habeas landscape. But
in light of Trevino, it is difficult to dispute the Court’s growing
preoccupation with procedural fairness—that is, a requirement of
a meaningful, or full and fair, opportunity to challenge one’s
conviction.454 Increasingly, the Court is recognizing that, at least
when it comes to safeguarding fair procedures and ensuring that
every prisoner has one full and fair opportunity to challenge the
legality of his conviction and sentence, innocence may still be
irrelevant.
454. Chief Justice Roberts complained about the result in Trevino because it ignored the
“repeated words of limitation that characterized the Martinez opinion.” See Trevino, 133 S.
Ct. at 1923-24 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
